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COMMENTS 
SCALING WALLER: HOW COURTS HAVE ERODED THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT 
ABSTRACT 
American courts and legal commentators have long praised the Sixth 
Amendment public trial right, but courts often lack the willingness to enforce 
it.  Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that violations of the 
public trial right belong to an exceedingly small class of constitutional errors 
requiring reversal, appellate courts persist in upholding improper courtroom 
closures even when the record shows that courts below have violated the 
applicable constitutional standard.  When criminal trials are fatally fouled by 
structural, constitutional error of this kind, the reluctance of appellate courts 
to reverse is damaging in two ways—it encourages repetition of the same 
mistake, and it denigrates core values of individual rights that underlie our 
system of justice.  This Comment argues for corrective action by explaining the 
rules governing courtroom closure, highlighting the errors often made by trial 
and appellate courts, and detailing the legal basis for more rigorous 
enforcement of the public trial right. 
Waller v. Georgia, decided in 1984, is perhaps the Supreme Court’s most 
definitive pronouncement on the scope of the Sixth Amendment public trial 
guarantee.  This Comment explains the background and significance of Waller, 
details the test it requires before a courtroom can be closed, and identifies 
specific shortcomings in appellate review that undermine the public trial right.  
In light of this assessment, appellate courts should: (1) refrain from applying 
harmless error analysis to violations of the public trial right; (2) regularly 
review alleged violations of Waller for plain error; (3) require application of 
the Waller test in all cases of courtroom closure—even if pursuant to state law; 
(4) refrain from using post hoc findings to justify closure; (5) reject the 
argument that “partial” closure of the courtroom absolves courts of the 
obligation to fully comply with Waller; and (6) recognize that even when 
courtrooms are closed to protect child victims of sexual abuse, the procedural 
rules of Waller still apply.  Courts may not look past constitutional errors 
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simply because state laws authorizing closure were drafted to protect victims, 
not defendants; such errors still require reversal, even in the absence of a 
well-preserved objection.  Although the Court recently turned its attention to 
the public trial right in Presley v. Georgia, the above issues remain 
unaddressed. 
INTRODUCTION 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial . . . . 
—United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment1 
“The harmless error rule is no way to gauge the great, though 
intangible, societal loss that flows” from closing courthouse doors. 
—Waller v. Georgia2 
American courts and legal commentators have long praised the Sixth 
Amendment public trial guarantee,3 but trial judges and appellate courts are 
often unwilling to enforce this fundamental right.  Although the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that violation of the public trial right belongs to an 
exceedingly small class of constitutional errors requiring reversal,4 state and 
federal appellate courts persist in upholding improper courtroom closures.  
When a criminal trial is fatally fouled by a courtroom closure that amounts to 
structural, constitutional error of this kind, an appellate court’s refusal to 
reverse fails to deter trial courts from repeating the same mistake and 
undermines the core values of individual rights central to our system of 
justice.5  This Comment argues for corrective action by explaining the rules 
governing courtroom closure, highlighting the errors made by trial and 
appellate courts, and detailing the legal basis for more rigorous enforcement of 
the public trial right.  The following anecdote illustrates the range of issues 
involved. 
 
 1 Throughout this Comment the terms “public trial right” and “public trial guarantee” are used 
interchangeably. 
 2 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (quoting People v. Jones, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (N.Y. 1979)). 
 3 See discussion infra Part I.A–B (tracing the historical developments of, and justification for, the public 
trial guarantee). 
 4 See discussion infra Part II.A (exploring the reasoning of Waller and its framework for securing the 
right to a public trial against court errors). 
 5 See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be 
Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1194–99 (1995) (arguing that inadequate judicial regard for individual 
rights erodes the sphere of personal liberty that distinctly undergirds the American criminal justice system). 
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After six years of unrelenting sexual abuse by her stepfather, David Wayne 
Craven’s eleven-year-old stepdaughter confided in family members, who 
contacted the police.6  Prosecutors charged Craven with aggravated sodomy 
and child molestation; he pleaded not guilty and insisted on a trial.7  
Immediately before the young victim testified, the trial judge cleared the 
courtroom of all but the parties, the lawyers, and courtroom personnel.8  Citing 
Georgia law, which requires courtroom closure during the testimony of any 
person under the age of sixteen regarding a criminal sex offense,9 the judge 
also removed the defendant’s family, even though the statute required that they 
be allowed to remain.10  After recognizing his error, the judge offered to have 
the victim repeat her testimony the next day with Craven’s family present.11  
Craven’s attorney declined, noting that “having the child testify twice would 
unduly emphasize [her] testimony.”12  Craven was convicted of aggravated 
sodomy and aggravated child molestation and sentenced to twenty-five years 
in prison.13 
On appeal, Craven claimed that the closure violated both state law and his 
federal constitutional right to a public trial.14  Citing Waller v. Georgia,15 
perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court’s most definitive pronouncement on the scope 
of the Sixth Amendment public trial guarantee,16 Craven argued that because 
violation of the public trial right constitutes “structural error,” he was not 
required to show how the mistake affected the outcome of the trial to overturn 
the verdict.17  Waller establishes clear guidelines for courtroom closure: 
[(1)] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an 
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [(2)] the closure 
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [(3)] the 
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the 
 
 6 Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied (Oct. 27, 2008). 
 7 Id. at 922. 
 8 Id. at 923. 
 9 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-54 (2009). 
 10 Id.; see also Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 924 (“As to the claim of a statutory violation, the trial court erred in 
removing Craven’s immediate family from the courtroom while the victim testified.”). 
 11 Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 924. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 922. 
 14 Id. at 923. 
 15 467 U.S. 39 (1984); see also Logan Munroe Chandler, Sixth Amendment—Public Trial Guarantee 
Applies to Pretrial Suppression Hearings, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 802 (1984) (discussing in detail the 
four-part procedural and protective framework of Waller). 
 16 Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 17 Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 923–24; see also infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
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hearing, and [(4) the trial court] must make findings adequate to 
support the closure.18 
Despite these rules, the trial court in Craven’s case held no hearing prior to 
closing the courtroom, made no findings of fact related to the closure, and did 
not explore less restrictive alternatives to closing the courtroom.19  The 
prosecution also neglected to advance an overriding interest likely to be 
harmed absent closure.  However, none of this troubled the Georgia Court of 
Appeals, which accepted the trial court’s observation that the state mandatory 
trial closure statute was “based upon a legislative determination that there is a 
compelling state interest in protecting children when they are testifying 
concerning a sex offense.”20  For the court of appeals, then, this presumably 
functioned as a proxy for Waller’s requirement that the trial court find an 
“overriding interest” justifying the closure.  Moreover, although appellate 
courts are forbidden from applying harmless error analysis to violations of the 
public trial right,21 the court of appeals maintained that excluding Craven’s 
family members was “harmless error” given all the evidence against him, 
which was indeed substantial.22  To bolster its argument, the court of appeals 
noted that because the purpose of the Georgia trial closure statute was to 
protect the child witness,23 any error by the trial court in excluding Craven’s 
family was of no account because the statute did “not necessarily confer[] a 
right upon the defendant.”24  Of course, the Constitution confers such a right, 
but the court of appeals concluded that Craven waived any constitutional claim 
because he failed to raise a constitutional objection until after the victim had 
testified.25  Classifying this sequence of events as a waiver was a mistake, 
 
 18 Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984)). 
 19 Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 923–25. 
 20 Id. at 924 (citation omitted). 
 21 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49–50. 
 22 Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 924.  The medical evidence showed “repeated sexual assaults,” the victim “drew 
explicit pictures reflecting what had happened,” and the victim’s mother and grandmother testified.  Id. at 924–
25. 
 23 Id. at 924. 
 24 Id. (quoting the opinion of the trial court).  In its failure to find error in the trial court’s exclusion of 
Craven’s family members, the Georgia Court of Appeals also overlooked a concern expressed by the Supreme 
Court regarding exclusion of a defendant’s friends and relatives.  See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72 
(1948) (“[W]ithout exception all courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his 
friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.”); see also Carson v. 
Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2005) (“‘The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendant’s 
family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.’” (quoting 
Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1996))). 
 25 Craven, 664 S.E.2d. at 924. 
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however, as Craven did not intentionally relinquish his right to object.26  Even 
if Craven did in fact fail to make a timely objection, these events still should 
have been subject to plain error review, under which appellate courts will 
consider any error that affects “substantial rights,” including even those errors 
not brought to the court’s attention.27  In this case, application of the plain error 
rule should have triggered an order for a new trial.28 
The Craven decision exemplifies two trends: (1) the tendency of trial courts 
to look past the straightforward, explicit requirements of Waller; and (2) the 
understandable reluctance of some appellate courts to reverse convictions of 
appellants who appear obviously guilty, in spite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement that violation of the public trial right always constitutes 
structural error.29  That reluctance is often, though certainly not always,30 
reinforced by the nature of the crime and the substantial evidence of guilt in 
these cases.  Because courtroom closure is frequently employed in child sex 
abuse cases—where the crimes are exceptionally deplorable, the testimony is 
disturbing and graphic, and the victims are especially vulnerable—it takes a 
strong-willed jurist to reverse such a conviction, even when the Constitution 
clearly requires it.  And when a defendant fails to properly object, the 
temptation to uphold the trial court’s closure order may be irresistible, 
regardless of the fact that the plain error rule should still require reversal.31 
But does upholding courtroom closure in the face of constitutional error 
really raise novel issues?  After all, the question of when legal error should be 
tolerated is not new,32 and while a criminal defendant has a constitutional right 
 
 26 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Waiver is different from forfeiture.  Whereas 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))). 
 27 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it 
was not brought to the court’s attention.”); see also Lynd v. State, 414 S.E.2d 5, 8 n.2 (Ga. 1992) (“‘Plain 
error’ is that which is ‘so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice’ or 
which ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.’” (quoting United 
States v. Fuentes-Coba, 738 F.2d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1984))). 
 28 See discussion infra Part III (detailing the authority and rationale for sua sponte plain error review). 
 29 See infra note 189 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of “structural error”). 
 30 See infra Part IV.E (discussing Presley v. State, 658 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 674 S.E.2d 
909 (Ga. 2009), rev’d per curiam, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) and criticizing the failure of Georgia 
Courts to follow Waller). 
 31 See discussion infra Part III. 
 32 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 5, at 1173–83 (reviewing the twentieth century history of harmless error 
jurisprudence). 
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to a fair trial, the proceeding need not be entirely free from error.33  Because 
the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence, and because public respect for the criminal process is enhanced by 
arriving at a just result, it is important that appellate courts tolerate the 
inevitable presence of immaterial error.34  However, over the past forty years 
the tendency of courts to tolerate immaterial error has expanded to include 
even grave constitutional errors.35 
In light of this trend, is there anything to be said about the reluctance of 
courts to uphold the public trial right beyond the predictable observation that 
courts are often called to balance cardinal principles of individual rights 
against the need for efficient justice—and that this balancing poses a special 
challenge when defendants appear obviously guilty?  The answer is decidedly 
yes, and the reason is straightforward: throughout its modern jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has never wavered from its holding that violation of the public 
trial right is among a small class of constitutional errors that remain 
automatically reversible and can never be subject to harmless error analysis.36  
In the eyes of the Court, such “structural errors” affect the framework of the 
trial itself and thus impugn the fairness and integrity of the entire proceeding.37  
The fact that the Court has explicitly reaffirmed this position38 while it has 
steadily weakened post-trial protection for other serious constitutional errors39 
further strengthens the case for consistent enforcement of the public trial right. 
 
 33 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“As we have stressed on more than one occasion, 
the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); see also Edwards, supra note 5, at 1186 (“Chapman 
heralded a major expansion in both the number of violations subject to harmless-error analysis and the 
frequency with which that analysis is employed.”). 
 36 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See id. at 294 (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the application of the harmless error rule to 
admission of involuntary confessions while also noting that violation of the public trial right is a constitutional 
error “that invalidate[s] a conviction even though there may be no reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty 
and would be convicted absent the trial error”); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 
(1997) (discussing, but not deciding, whether the failure to submit the materiality of a false statement to the 
jury affected the defendant’s substantial rights, but noting that violation of the right to a public trial is 
“structural error,” which does affect substantial rights). 
 39 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306 (“[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.”); see also Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 652 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“By now it goes without saying that 
harmless-error review is of almost universal application; there are few errors that may not be forgiven as 
harmless.” (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306–07)). 
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In addition to mistakenly applying the harmless error rule, trial and 
appellate courts often make four other mistakes that violate the Waller scheme: 
(1) they ignore the plain error doctrine, which requires reversal in the face of a 
bona fide violation of a defendant’s public trial right, even when the defendant 
fails to object;40 (2) they resort to post hoc findings to justify closure when the 
trial court fails to hold a hearing and make the findings required by Waller;41 
(3) they apply a doctrine of “partial closure” to suggest that the four-part 
Waller test need not apply under certain circumstances;42 and (4) they assert 
that state trial closure statutes provide a sufficient proxy for the Waller test and 
then hold that any failure to follow the state trial closure statute is irrelevant 
because the law is for the benefit of the victim.43  Although the Supreme Court 
has set clear rules for what constitutes a violation of the public trial right, it has 
yet to address any of these particular issues since deciding Waller. 
This Comment draws on the Court’s jurisprudence upholding the public 
trial right, and on related opinions of federal and state courts, to show how 
each of the rationales used by trial and appellate courts to circumvent the 
Waller rules is flawed, and to argue for more rigorous enforcement of the 
public trial right.  Part I discusses the origins of the public trial right, including 
its assertion by invoking both the First and Sixth Amendments, and cases 
leading up to Waller.  Part II details the significance of Waller, the origins of 
the harmless and structural error doctrines and their application to 
constitutional error, and the rule that violation of the public trial right is always 
structural—and never harmless—error.  Part III explains why reversal is 
required under the plain error rule when violations of the public trial right 
occur, even when the defendant fails to object.  Part IV examines in more 
detail how courts have treated—and often undermined—the public trial right 
by adopting suspect practices like providing post hoc rationales to justify 
closure and citing state law doctrines to relieve themselves of the responsibility 
to follow Waller. 
In sum, this Comment makes the case for corrective reform and argues that 
appellate courts must: (1) refrain from applying harmless error analysis to 
 
 40 See discussion infra Part III (arguing for the consistent application of plain error review to violations 
of Waller). 
 41 See discussion infra Part IV.A (examining cases in which post hoc justifications are used to affirm 
erroneous courtroom closure). 
 42 See discussion infra Part IV.B (examining cases in which courts fail to appropriately balance interests 
as required by Waller). 
 43 See discussion infra Part IV.C–D (examining cases in which courts use state closure statutes as a proxy 
for incomplete and unsatisfactory application of the requirements of Waller). 
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violations of the public trial right; (2) regularly subject violations of Waller to 
plain error review; (3) require application of the four-part Waller test in all 
cases of courtroom closure—even if such closure occurs pursuant to state law; 
(4) refrain from using post hoc findings to justify closure; (5) reject the 
argument that closure pursuant to state law absolves trial courts of the 
obligation to comply with Waller; and (6) recognize that the benefit-of-the-
victim doctrine cannot excuse a constitutional mistake that is triggered by a 
statutory error that violates Waller.  In Presley v. Georgia, decided January 19, 
2010, the U.S. Supreme Court once again reiterated the importance of the 
public trial right, but its decision did not address any of the above issues.44 
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL GUARANTEE 
This Part discusses the origin of the public trial right as well as the 
countervailing reasons most often invoked to justify courtroom closure.  While 
state and federal courts have historically made firm pronouncements about the 
sanctity of the public trial right, it was not until the early 1980s that the 
Supreme Court finally arrived at a coherent set of rules for balancing the 
competing interests of defendants, victim-witnesses, and the public.  This Part 
discusses the cases that created the legal framework for balancing these and 
other interests, and explains the rationale behind the rules the Court developed, 
culminating in Waller v. Georgia in 1984.  This Part also compares different 
closure cases and the rationale employed in each to show how courtroom 
closures were often as arbitrary as the logic employed by the individual trial 
judges who ordered them—or as valid as any particular appellate court held 
them to be. 
A. The Origins of the Public Trial Guarantee 
Although the right to a public trial existed under English common law,45 its 
adoption as part of the Bill of Rights46 stemmed from a greater appreciation for 
 
 44 78 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (per curiam). 
 45 Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 382 (1932) (quoting Matthew Hale, writing 
around 1670, that evidence is “given ‘in the open court and in the presence of the parties, counsel, and all by-
standers . . . .’”). 
 46 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Prior to ratification of the Constitution in 1791, the constitutions of six states 
provided for a speedy trial right.  Radin, supra note 45, at 383 n.5a.  Only Pennsylvania specified that the 
proceeding be “public,” while North Carolina required that criminal convictions by jury verdict be rendered 
“in open court.”  Id.; see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267 n.15 (1948).  For a concise overview of the 
Colonial attitude toward the public trial right and related observations about the adoption of the Sixth 
Amendment, see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 424–27 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring and 
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the rights of the accused in America than could be found in Britain.47  As Max 
Radin observed, although a defendant was entitled to a public trial in England, 
the privilege did not count for much.48  The authorities held a defendant 
virtually incommunicado until trial, denied him the right to prepare for his own 
defense, and gave no notice of the evidence against him until trial.49  A 
defendant also had no right to counsel, no right to confront witnesses against 
him, and no right to call witnesses on his own behalf—and even if he could, a 
defendant would have had no idea what evidence the witnesses might give 
because he had no right to examine them beforehand.50  According to Radin: 
Under these circumstances it is more than doubtful that it was the 
prisoner’s interest which created the [public trial] practice.  We may 
well imagine that the poor wretches who stood in the dock could not 
have highly valued the fact that, for a brief period, there would be a 
little audience to see them arraigned, convicted, and sentenced—all 
three of which events, in those sturdy times, might well take place in 
a single day.51 
Taking into account the totality of these proceedings, the public aspect of 
such trials probably did less to protect the rights of the accused and more to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the convictions obtained.52  However, irrespective 
of what may have been the original function of the public trial guarantee under 
these conditions, its effect has been hailed by many.53  One supporter was 
Jeremy Bentham, who famously observed in 1827 that “[w]ithout publicity, all 
 
dissenting).  Following ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, a majority of states adopted constitutional 
requirements for a public trial, borrowing language from the Sixth Amendment.  In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 267; 
see also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 414 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Forty-eight of the fifty 
States protect the right to a public trial in one way or another.  Forty-five have constitutional provisions 
specifically guaranteeing the right . . . .”). 
 47 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268–69, 269 n.22 (recounting the “excesses of the English Court of 
Star Chamber” in which the accused “was grilled in secret [and] often tortured, in an effort to obtain a 
confession”). 
 48 Radin, supra note 45, at 384. 
 49 Id. at 383 (citing JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 350 
(1883)). 
 50 Id. at 383–84. 
 51 Id. at 384. 
 52 United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 853 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978) (“It is doubtful that at common law 
the requirement that trials be held in public grew up as a right of the accused at all.”); see also Douglas Hay, 
Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 48 (1975) (arguing that the “peculiar genius of the law [was that it] allowed the rulers 
of England to make the courts a selective instrument of class justice, yet simultaneously to proclaim the law’s 
incorruptible impartiality, and absolute determinacy”). 
 53 See infra notes 54, 58–62 and accompanying text. 
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other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of 
small account.”54 
When discussing the main impetus for the adoption of the Sixth 
Amendment public trial guarantee, American courts and commentators have 
been quick to cite the “historical warnings of the evil practice of the Star 
Chamber in England,”55 the infamous practices of the Spanish Inquisition, and 
the lettres de cachet of the French monarchy.56  As the Supreme Court 
explained, “[a]ll of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to liberty.  
In the hands of despotic groups each of them had become an instrument for the 
suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right 
of an accused to a fair trial.”57 
American courts often cite Thomas Cooley, the renowned nineteenth 
century constitutional scholar, when articulating the values of a public trial.  A 
public proceeding, he observed, “is for the benefit of the accused; that the 
public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned and that the 
presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of 
their responsibility and to the importance of their functions . . . .”58  Crediting 
Hale and Blackstone, courts also have emphasized the importance of a public 
trial in drawing out persons who may know the facts of a case and thus deliver 
important testimony.59  Public trials produce a more reliable result because 
they presumably discourage perjury60 and engender basic fairness.61  As Justice 
Harlan observed nearly two decades before Waller: 
 
 54 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827). 
 55 Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917).  But see Radin, supra note 45, at 386–87 (“As 
far as the Star Chamber is concerned, the Parliamentary opponents of that tribunal never seem to have picked 
out secrecy as characteristic of it or as a reprehensible practice in it. . . .  There was apparently nothing secret 
about the practice of this court, and the grievance the Parliament had against it was rather its power, than the 
method in which that power was exercised.”). 
 56 Radin, supra note 45, at 388 (“The lettre de cachet was a document bearing the king’s private seal 
(cachet) . . . [and was] most frequently used as a means of interfering in the ordinary course of justice and of 
arbitrarily ordering the indefinite imprisonment of any particular person.”). 
 57 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 269–70. 
 58 Id. at 270 n.25 (citing 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 647 (8th ed. 1927)). 
 59 Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59–60 (9th Cir. 1944); see also State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 
798, 803 n.5 (N.D. 1989) (observing that the presence of family members might assure “testimonial 
trustworthiness”). 
 60 See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (“In addition to ensuring that judge and prosecutor carry 
out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury.”). 
 61 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (citing Hale and Blackstone for 
the “importance of openness to the proper functioning of a trial [because] it gave assurance that the 
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, 
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Essentially, the public-trial guarantee embodies a view of human 
nature, true as a general rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and 
jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an 
open court than in secret proceedings.  A fair trial is the objective, 
and “public trial” is an institutional safeguard for attaining it.62 
Public trials also advance the much broader social purpose that ‘“[i]n this 
country it is a first principle that the people have the right to know what is 
done in their courts.’”63 
1. In re Oliver 
The public trial right has been held in high esteem by courts and 
commentators alike, but it was not until In re Oliver,64  in 1948, that the 
Supreme Court held that the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
applied to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment.65  In 
In re Oliver, the Court reversed the criminal contempt conviction of a man 
who had been summoned by a Michigan judge to testify privately as a witness 
in “a ‘one-man grand jury’ investigation into alleged gambling and official 
corruption.”66  Finding the witness not credible, the judge convicted him of 
contempt and sentenced him to sixty days in jail.67  The Michigan Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the “mantle of secrecy” surrounding the proceedings violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.68  In re Oliver was a landmark Supreme 
Court case, but it drew on earlier decisions of the lower federal courts that 
were no less insistent on enforcing the public trial right. 
 
and decisions based on secret bias or partiality”).  But see Radin, supra note 45, at 384 (“[I]t is clear that [Hale 
and Blackstone] are scarcely thinking of the privileges of the accused, but of the effectiveness of the process of 
trial, which in the minds of most official persons of all times means the expedition and frequency of conviction 
and not the facilitation of acquittal.”). 
 62 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 63 See State v. Keeler, 156 P. 1080, 1084 (Mont. 1916) (quoting In re Shortridge, 34 P. 227, 228 (Cal. 
1893)).  “The people are interested in knowing, and have the right to know, how their servants—the judge, 
county attorney, sheriff, and clerk—conduct the public’s business.”  Id. at 1083. 
 64 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
 65 Barbara Hricko Wait, Comment, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Access to Government 
Proceedings—Voir Dire of Jurors—Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. 
ANN. 199, 202 (1985) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273). 
 66 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 258.  The proceeding was authorized under Michigan law.  Id. at 261. 
 67 Id. at 259. 
 68 Id. at 273. 
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2. Davis v. United States 
In 1917, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declared in Davis v. United 
States69 that “[t]he corrective influence of public attendance at trials for crime 
was considered important to the liberty of the people, and it is only by steadily 
supporting the safeguard that it is kept from being undermined and finally 
destroyed.”70  In Davis, the defendants were charged in federal court in 
connection with a train robbery, and by the end of the trial an excitable crowd 
had gathered.71  Anticipating a disruption, the trial judge cleared the courtroom 
of everyone but members of the bar, defendants’ relatives, and newspaper 
reporters.72  The defendant was convicted and later appealed.  Noting that the 
courtroom was not overcrowded and that no “person was making a disturbance 
or threatening to do so,”73 the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on Sixth 
Amendment grounds.  The Davis opinion is also noteworthy on two other 
counts: (1) it emphatically declared that violations of the public trial right are 
not harmless error;74 and (2) it compared eleven leading cases upholding 
courtroom closures with six others in which the exclusion of spectators was 
held unconstitutional under state provisions identical to the Sixth 
Amendment.75  In doing so, Davis characterized the exceptions to the public 
trial right as “few” and “based upon considerations of public morals and peace 
and good order in the courtrooms.”76  In contrast, those decisions finding a 
 
 69 247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917). 
 70 Id. at 395. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 394. 
 73 Id. at 395. 
 74 Id. at 398–99 (“It is urged that no prejudice to defendants was shown.  A violation of the constitutional 
right necessarily implies prejudice and more than that need not appear.  Furthermore, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, in such cases for a defendant to point to any definite, personal injury.  To require him to do so 
would impair or destroy the safeguard.”). 
 75 Id. at 396–98 (“We turn now to those [cases] in which [the courtroom closures] have been 
disapproved.”).  As the discussion of State v. Osborne, Tilton v. State, and State v. Hensley in this subsection 
reveals, the closures at issue in those cases were held invalid on state constitutional grounds.  See infra notes 
87–97 and accompanying text.  In People v. Hartman, the court did not explicitly distinguish between the 
California and federal constitutions, but clearly stated that the closure was “in direct violation of that provision 
of the constitution which says that a party accused of crime has a right to a public trial.”  37 P. 153, 154 (Cal. 
1894).  Likewise, the closures in People v. Yeager and People v. Murray were held to violate section 28 of 
article 6 of the Michigan Constitution.  See People v. Yeager, 71 N.W. 491, 492 (1897) (relying on Murray and 
stating that “if such a trial as is provided for by the [state trial closure] statute is not a public trial, the act is 
plainly in conflict with section 28 of article 6 of the constitution . . . .”); People v. Murray, 50 N.W. 995, 997 
(Mich. 1891) (“We cannot accept the conclusion of the judge, ‘that the trial was at all times during the same a 
public trial, within the meaning of the [state] constitution.’”); infra notes 191–94 and accompanying text 
(discussing Murray). 
 76 Davis, 247 F. at 396. 
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violation of the public trial right were described as “well founded in principle 
and reason.”77 
In reality, there was not much of a distinction between those cases where 
the closures were ruled erroneous and those where the closures were upheld.  
The following brief comparative analysis reveals that the differences in 
outcome did not stem from the application of a well-ordered rule to different 
facts—after all, there was no such rule until the 1980s.  Instead, the variation 
was more likely the product of relatively arbitrary judicial decision making 
against the backdrop of controversial circumstances.  In this context some 
courts simply appear to have been more willing than others to accept the 
implicit moralistic reasoning justifying closure.  For example, in Benedict v. 
People,78 the defendant was convicted of “the infamous crime against 
nature,”79 the trial involved “the recital of disgusting facts,”80 and the selective 
exclusion of spectators was upheld.81  In State v. McCool,82 the prosecution 
asked for all women to be excluded, as the county attorney “was about to refer 
to some of the evidence which was unfit for ladies to hear.”83  And in People v. 
Swafford,84 everyone but the judge, jurors, witnesses, and persons connected 
with the case was excluded on the grounds that “the word ‘public’ in the 
Constitution was used in opposition to secret, and [thus the] defendant was not 
denied a public trial.”85  Like Benedict, the exclusions in McCool and Swafford 
were upheld, though Swafford was eventually “held unsound.”86 
In contrast to these ostensibly legitimate closures, the Davis court cited 
State v. Osborne,87 a rape case in which the exclusion of all but the defendant, 
the attorneys, the jury, officers of the court, and testifying witnesses “was 
vigorously condemned” by the Oregon Supreme Court on state constitutional 
grounds.88  Likewise, in Tilton v. State,89 a case of adultery with a fourteen-
 
 77 Id. at 398. 
 78 46 P. 637 (Colo. 1896). 
 79 Id. (referring to the offense of sodomy). 
 80 Id. at 638. 
 81 Id. 
 82 9 P. 745 (Kan. 1886). 
 83 Id. at 747. 
 84 3 P. 809 (Cal. 1884). 
 85 Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 396–97 (8th Cir. 1917). 
 86 See id. at 397–98 (noting that Swafford was “an extreme case” that was later “held unsound” by People 
v. Hartman, 37 P. 153, 154 (Cal. 1894)).   
 87 103 P. 62 (Or. 1909). 
 88 Davis, 247 F. at 397.  See also Osborne, 103 P. at 63–64 (“It is argued that the procedure complained 
of is in violation of the plain provisions of both our national and state Constitutions. . . .  [W]hatever the rule 
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year-old girl, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court could have 
excluded, with “perfect legality,”90 all minors and women from the courtroom, 
but that its order banishing everyone not connected with the case was “too 
sweeping”91 under the state constitution.92  There, the judge had closed the 
courtroom, citing state law authorizing trial courts to clear the courtroom of 
“‘all or any portion of the audience’” in “‘any cause of seduction or divorce, or 
other case where the evidence is vulgar or obscene, or relates to the improper 
acts of the sexes, and tends to debauch the morals of the young . . . .’”93  And 
in State v. Hensley,94 a case of statutory rape, when the trial was adjourned to a 
smaller courtroom to hear “immoral or obscene testimony,”95 the public was 
excluded, but reporters were allowed to remain.96  The Ohio Supreme Court 
held that “the order of exclusion was too general . . . and that the defendant 
was not accorded . . . a public trial.”97 
 
on that subject may be with reference to the national organic law on the subject, the Constitution of our state is 
to the same effect.” (citations omitted)). 
 89 62 S.E. 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908). 
 90 Id. at 654. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 651 (citing GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 1, para. 5, which “provides, among other things, that 
‘every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state . . . shall have a public trial’”).  The 
Georgia Constitution was revised in 1983, during a special session of the General Assembly at which the 
public trial provision was moved from article VI, the judicial article, to article I, section 1, paragraph 11(a).  
See MELVIN B. HILL, JR., THE GEORGIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 29, 42–43 (1994); see 
also H.R. 4 136th Gen. Assem., Extraordinary Sess. (Ga. 1981) (proposing a new constitution for the State of 
Georgia), available at http://www.sos.georgia.gov/archives/what_do_we_have/online_records/historic_ 
documents/1983_georgia_constitution/default.htm. 
 93 Tilton, 62 S.E. at 651 (citing section 5296 of the Georgia Civil Code of 1895).  The constitutionality of 
the statute was not challenged.  Id. 
 94 79 N.E. 462 (Ohio 1906). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 464.  In holding the closure invalid on state constitutional grounds, the court observed that 
“[p]rovisions respecting a public trial similar to that of our Constitution . . . are found in the federal 
Constitution, and in most, if not all, of the Constitutions of the states of the Union . . . .”  Id. at 463.  Hensley 
also contains an impassioned justification for the application of the plain error rule to violations of the public 
trial right: 
[C]ounsel for the state [insists] that, because no specific objection or exception was entered by 
the defendant at the time the order was made or was being enforced, the error, if any was 
committed, cannot now be taken advantage of.  This objection ignores the force and effect of the 
constitutional provision.  The right to a public trial is guarantied [sic].  It is of the same high 
order of right as the other guaranties [sic] embodied in the section—that to appear and defend in 
person and with counsel, that to meet the witnesses face to face and have compulsory process, 
and that to a trial by jury.  The right cannot be waived by silence any more than can the right to 
be tried by jury where the accusation is a felony and the plea is not guilty. 
Id. at 464. 
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Of course, the right to a public trial is not an unqualified one.  The next 
section more closely examines the reasons cited to justify courtroom closure 
and shows how core principles and lofty rhetoric favoring the public trial right 
can give way to other interests—some more credible than others. 
B. Countervailing Values and Interests: The Justification for Courtroom 
Closure 
Most discussions of the public trial guarantee take as their premise the age-
old fear of despotic regimes,98 as well as concern over “possible abuse of 
judicial power,”99 and the need to “safeguard against any attempt to  
employ . . . courts as instruments of persecution.”100  Perhaps it is because of 
these concerns that courtrooms have been closed in the United States relatively 
rarely by government officials pursuing their own objectives or seeking to 
quash dissent.101  Instead, as evidenced by the cases discussed in Davis,102 
courtroom closures since the late nineteenth century appear to have been 
triggered most often by sex crime prosecutions.103  Historically, these closures 
have been justified by a desire to preserve “public morals and public 
 
 98 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268–70 (1948) (discussing the “traditional Anglo-American 
distrust for secret trials”); see also People v. Murray, 50 N.W. 995, 998 (Mich. 1891) (citing the “great abuses 
practiced in England . . . in conducting criminal prosecutions” as the impetus for including the public trial right 
in the 1850 Michigan Constitution and “in all of the constitutions of the American states and of the United 
States”). 
 99 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270. 
 100 Id. 
 101 As the discussion in Davis of the cases reveals, government misconduct is not frequently at issue in 
cases where judges order courtroom closure.  See Part I.A.2 (discussing Davis); infra note 103 (listing sex 
crime cases precipitating closure).  For an example of a courtroom closure which does appear motivated by a 
desire to shield government misconduct, see Murray, 50 N.W. at 996–98 (holding unconstitutional on state 
constitutional grounds the exclusion of all but “respectable citizens” from the courtroom during the trial of a 
defendant charged with murdering a police officer, where the only persons allowed entry were “about a dozen 
policemen, three or four detectives, several police commissioners, and others apparently interested in the 
conviction of [the] defendant”). 
 102 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 103 Of the seventeen cases discussed in Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 396–98 (8th Cir. 1917), eleven 
involved offenses of a sexual nature: Grimmett v. State, 2 S.W. 631 (Tex. Ct. App. 1886) (assault with intent to 
rape); Benedict v. People, 46 P. 637 (Colo. 1896) (sodomy); State v. Nyhus, 124 N.W. 71 (N.D. 1909) (rape of 
a girl under fourteen); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1919) (rape); State v. Callahan, 110 N.W. 
342 (Minn. 1907) (convicted of assault with intent to rape); People v. Swafford, 3 P. 809, 809 (Cal. 1884) 
(noting that the defendant “was charged with abducting a chaste female under age”); State v. Osborne, 103 P. 
62 (Or. 1909) (assault with intent to rape); Tilton v. State, 62 S.E. 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (adultery with a 
fourteen-year-old girl); State v. Hensley, 79 N.E. 462 (Ohio 1906) (statutory rape); People v. Hartman, 37 P. 
153 (Cal. 1894) (assault with intent to commit rape); People v. Yeager, 71 N.W. 491 (Mich. 1897) (assault 
with intent to commit rape). 
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decency”104 or to elicit sensitive testimony from victims.105  Other 
justifications for courtroom closure include preserving the anonymity of a 
police officer in an undercover “buy and bust” drug investigation,106 
encouraging testimony by witnesses who fear retaliation,107 and maintaining 
public safety and order in the courtroom.108  Preventing disclosure of sensitive 
government information is also a compelling interest that sometimes justifies 
closure.109 
 
 104 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 441 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed. 1903) (noting 
the “evidences of human depravity which the trial must necessarily bring to light”); see also Harris v. 
Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 890–91 (8th Cir. 1966) (calling the practice of closing the courtroom to spectators 
during testimony of “a twenty-three year old virgin” who was the victim of rape “a frequent and accepted 
practice when the lurid details of such a crime must be related by a young lady”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Super. Ct., 423 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Mass. 1981) (observing that while “the constitutional right of access to trials 
arises in part from an unbroken tradition of openness . . . .  [t]here is at least one notable exception to this 
history.  In cases involving sexual assaults, portions of trials have been closed to some segments of the public, 
even when the victim was an adult.” (citations omitted)), rev’d, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 105 See Callahan, 110 N.W. at 345 (upholding the constitutionality of courtroom closure to facilitate 
testimony by a rape victim who was “seriously embarrassed by . . . a crowd of spectators”); Grimmett, 2 S.W. 
at 633–34 (upholding, under the state constitution, the exclusion of most spectators, in part “to relieve the 
witness of the embarrassment which . . . the disorderly conduct of [the] crowd[] occasioned”).  But see 
Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that “[i]t would be denying the defendant 
his presumption of innocence” to hold that a rape victim “must be relieved of . . . embarrassment” because she 
is called to testify about the crime “and her shame”). 
 106 See Bowden v. Keane, 237 F.3d 125, 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding “narrow courtroom closure” 
where an undercover narcotics officer articulated “even a generalized fear that his safety could be endangered 
by testifying in open court, and explain[ed] in rough terms the basis of his fear”).  But see Vidal v. Williams, 
31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas corpus where the defendant’s 
parents were excluded from the courtroom “to prevent them from recognizing [the arresting officer] . . . and 
disclosing his identity” because the parents “lived in a ‘high drug area’” and might possibly encounter the 
officer or “disclos[e] his identity as retribution for their son’s conviction.”). 
 107 See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 32 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding closure where the 
evidence supported “the victim’s well-reasoned fear of [the defendant]”). 
 108 See, e.g., People v. Kerrigan, 14 P. 849, 850 (Cal. 1887) (upholding courtroom closure where the 
defendant, convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, had addressed the judge and officers of court 
with “vulgar and profane language,” thereby creating so much commotion that the spectators were ordered to 
leave the courtroom). 
 109 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984).  A thorough exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of 
this Comment.  However, for a relevant discussion in the context of a recent national security prosecution, see 
United States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2006).  In Abu Marzook, the courtroom was 
ordered closed during testimony of Israeli intelligence agents, but the court held that a suppression hearing 
authorized under the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. (2006), also must “square[] with 
the Constitution” and ‘“meet the test set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors.’”  Abu Marzook, 412 F. 
Supp. 2d at 924–28 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 47). 
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With the advent of the victims’ rights movement110 and heightened 
sensitivity toward sex crime victims in particular, prosecutors and courts have 
often justified courtroom closure as necessary to protect the dignity and 
psychological integrity of the victim111 and to encourage victim testimony.112  
Courts have paid particular attention to these issues where children and 
teenagers are concerned.113 
Without clear guidelines for courtroom closure it is not surprising that 
different judges assessing even similar facts and weighing similar interests, 
such as protecting the psychological integrity of a rape victim, might decide 
differently about excluding the public.114  What is important to note is the 
range of countervailing interests that have been cited to justify courtroom 
closure.  The next section examines the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases on 
this issue—including two where closure was requested by the defendant in the 
interest of a fair trial115—to explain how the Court ultimately settled on clear 
procedural requirements, culminating in Waller.  These procedures ensure that 
 
 110 See Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims’ Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 
11 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1984); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights 
Movement, 3 UTAH L. REV. 517, 524 (1985) (“The early voices [of the victims’ rights movement] were 
frequently feminine . . . .  Their concern was for a particular victim, the victim of rape.”). 
 111 See United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 694–96 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding the trial 
court’s dismissal of spectators because testimony by the victim, a “21-year-old unmarried woman,” about her 
rape by four men “posed a substantial threat of indignity to the witness”). 
 112 See Farmer, 32 F.3d at 372.  But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607–10 (1982) 
(criticizing as “speculative in empirical terms” the claim that mandatory trial closure during testimony of a 
minor victim “will lead to an increase in the number of minor sex victims coming forward”). 
 113 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 (noting that the interests cited by the State of Massachusetts 
justifying mandatory trial closure during the testimony of minor victims “are reducible to two: the protection 
of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment; and the encouragement of such 
victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner”).  For a discussion of child victims of 
sexual abuse and the legal process, including the issues raised by courtroom closure during child testimony in 
light of the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants, see Donald C. Bross, Protecting Child Witnesses, 
in FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY: LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE MALTREATED CHILD 117, 117–26 
(Donald C. Bross & Laura Freeman Michaels eds., 1987) and JAMES SELKIN & PETER G.W. SCHOUTEN, THE 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM: A SOURCE BOOK 91–102 (1987).  See also AM. 
PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 441, 441–62 (3d ed. 2004) (“Testifying in court can be a frightening 
experience for crime victims, but it is especially so for child witnesses.  Courtrooms are large and intimidating, 
and a child witness must make public an intensely private and shameful experience in the presence of the 
abuser.”).  But see McIntosh v. United States, 933 A.2d 370, 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing defendant’s 
conviction of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old girl on the ground that the partial closure of the 
courtroom during the child’s testimony violated Waller, in spite of the fact that the child, who had “limited 
mental capacity” and other problems, would suffer “trauma and embarrassment” from testifying in public). 
 114 See discussion of cases supra notes 105–06. 
 115 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368, 379–84 (1979). 
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trial courts properly balance the interests involved when deciding to close the 
courtroom and require that trial courts create a suitable record for appellate 
review. 
C. Asserting the Public Trial Guarantee Through the First Amendment 
In re Oliver, decided in 1948, held that the Sixth Amendment applies to 
state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment,116 but it took 
another three decades for the Supreme Court to hold that the press and public 
have the right to attend state criminal trials under the First Amendment.117  In 
arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the history of 
openness in criminal proceedings,118 which it saw as essential to both the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system and America’s “republican 
system of self-government.”119  The interests of the public and the press must 
be balanced, however, against the defendant’s right to a fair trial, as well as 
other interests previously discussed, such as the anonymity of undercover 
police officers, or the need to elicit sensitive testimony from sex crime 
victims.120  The Court ultimately articulated the same criteria for evaluating the 
constitutionality of courtroom closures under both the First and Sixth 
Amendments, but these early First Amendment cases laid the foundation for 
the four-part test the Court eventually established in Waller.121 
 
 116 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 117 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–80 (plurality opinion).  Although Justice Burger authored the 
plurality opinion, in which he was joined by Justices White and Stevens, the various concurrences of Justices 
Marshall, Brennan, Stewart and Blackmun all agreed that the First Amendment ensured a right of public 
access to criminal trials.  Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.  See generally Lawrence J. Morris, Note, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Closure of Trials—The Press and the Public Have a First Amendment Right of 
Access to Attend Criminal Trials, Which Cannot Be Closed Absent an Overriding Interest.  Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), 64 MARQ. L. REV. 717 (1981) (discussing U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence concerning the public trial right in the context of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers); 
George W. Kelly, Richmond Newspapers and the First Amendment Right of Access, 18 AKRON L. REV. 33 
(1984); William K. Meyer, Note, Evaluating Court Closures After Richmond Newspapers: Using Sixth 
Amendment Standards to Enforce a First Amendment Right, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 304, 309 (1982). 
 118 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (plurality opinion) (“From this unbroken, uncontradicted 
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption 
of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.”). 
 119 Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 120 See supra Part I.B. 
 121 See articles cited supra note 117. 
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1. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia was the first case to establish the 
right of the press and public to attend criminal trials, but it had an unusual 
procedural history.122  After the defendant was tried three times unsuccessfully 
for murder (the first conviction was reversed on appeal and two mistrials 
followed),123 he asked the trial court in the fourth proceeding to close the 
courtroom, and the motion was unopposed.124  In ordering the courtroom 
cleared “of all parties except the witnesses when they testify,”125 the trial court 
cited a state law that permitted the exclusion of “any persons whose presence 
would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused 
to a public trial shall not be violated.”126 
In the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger127 wrote that, based on an 
“unbroken, uncontradicted history” of open criminal trials,128 the “fundamental 
right” of the public to attend criminal trials is “implicit in the guarantees of the 
First Amendment”129 and applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.130  Because the trial court had: (1) made no findings to support 
the closure, (2) conducted no inquiry into alternatives, and (3) failed to 
recognize a constitutional right for either the public or the press to attend the 
trial, the Supreme Court held the closure improper under the First 
Amendment.131  In his concurrence, Justice Stevens hailed Richmond 
Newspapers as a “watershed case” for “unequivocally hold[ing] that an 
arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment  
 
 122 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559–63 (plurality opinion). 
 123 Id. at 559.  The defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder, but the Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed because a blood-stained shirt “had been improperly admitted into evidence.”  Id.; see also 
Morris, supra note 117, at 722 n.28. 
 124 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S at 559–60 (plurality opinion). 
 125 Id. at 560. 
 126 Id. at 560 n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Supp. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127 Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White and Stevens, with four other Justices concurring in 
the judgment.  Id. at 558 (syllabus).  Justice Powell took no part in the decision.  Id.  However, in Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion in Gannett v. DePasquale, he indicated a belief that the First Amendment gives 
the press a limited “right of access” to criminal trials.  443 U.S. 368, 397–98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 128 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S at 556, 573 (plurality opinion). 
 129 Id. at 580. 
 130 Id.  Justice Rehnquist disagreed, filing the only dissent and rejecting any application of the First, Sixth, 
or Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 605–06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist also took his fellow 
Justices to task for “smother[ing] a healthy pluralism which would ordinarily exist in a national government 
embracing 50 States.”  Id. 
 131 Id. at 580–81 (plurality opinion). 
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of . . . the First Amendment.”132  In a separate concurrence, Justices Brennan 
and Marshall went well beyond a discussion of access to information and 
emphasized the “structural role” of the First Amendment “in securing and 
fostering our republican system of self-government.”133 
2. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale 
Although Richmond Newspapers was a case of first impression regarding 
the First Amendment right of the public to attend criminal trials, the Court had 
struggled with many of the same issues under the framework of the Sixth 
Amendment a year earlier in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.134  In Gannett, the 
majority held that because the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is 
“personal to the accused,”135 the public does not have an independent right 
under either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials.136  
In that case—a murder trial—the trial court had approved, without objection, a 
defense motion to close a pre-trial suppression hearing where “the unabated 
buildup of adverse publicity had jeopardized the ability of the defendants to 
receive a fair trial.”137  The posture of Gannett was thus quite similar to 
Richmond Newspapers, where the request to close the courtroom had also been 
made by the defendant and was unopposed, and the lower court had also 
invoked the defendant’s right to a fair trial to justify the closure.138  Faced with 
an apparent conflict between the interests of the public and the defendant, the 
majority in Gannett concluded that the right to close the courtroom belonged to 
the defendant.139  Making an analogy to the defendant’s right to waive a jury 
trial, the majority observed that “if the defendant waives his right to a jury 
trial, and the prosecutor and the judge consent, it could hardly be seriously 
argued that a member of the public could demand a jury trial because of the 
societal interest in that mode of fact-finding.”140 
 
 132 Id. at 582–83 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 133 Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Kelly, supra note 117, at 36 (noting that under this 
analysis the First Amendment is “linked to the process of communication necessary for the survival of 
democracy”). 
 134 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
 135 Id. at 379–80; see also id. at 381 n.9 (“Numerous commentators have also recognized that only a 
defendant has a right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment.”).  For a thorough discussion of Gannett, 
see Morris, supra note 117, at 717–21. 
 136 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391. 
 137 Id. at 375. 
 138 See discussion of Richmond Newspapers supra Part I.C.1. 
 139 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379–80. 
 140 Id. at 383–84.  But see United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 854 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that the 
Sixth Amendment public trial right provides the public a qualified right of access to criminal trials and 
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Other Justices, however, were not so quick to dispense with this “societal 
interest” in public trials.  In a dissent by Justice Blackmun, and joined by 
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, the minority invoked the history of the 
public trial right under English and American common law to support their 
conclusion that the Sixth Amendment, incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits states from closing the courtroom to the public unless 
“full and fair consideration [is given] to the public’s interests in maintaining an 
open proceeding . . . .  [n]otwithstanding the fact it is the accused who seeks to 
close the trial.”141 
Although the Court in Gannett was divided over the extent to which the 
public trial right is strictly “personal to the accused”142 or whether the societal 
value of criminal proceedings could trump the interests of a defendant, all nine 
Justices were moving toward a consensus position requiring trial courts to 
more rigorously consider these competing interests before excluding the public 
from any criminal proceeding.  It took the intervening decision in Richmond 
Newspapers in 1980, and the deliberations of the Court in two subsequent 
cases,143 to clearly establish the framework under which all Justices would 
agree that “the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less 
protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press 
and public.”144  The decisions of the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court also set the 
standards for the determination established in Waller regarding how courts 
should enforce the Sixth Amendment public trial right of criminal 
defendants.145 
3. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 
In Richmond Newspapers,146 the Court held for the very first time that the 
public and the press have a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal 
trials, but the Justices could not agree on a central rationale for their 
 
observing that “‘justice cannot survive behind walls of silence,’ even when those walls are erected at the 
behest of the defendant” (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966))). 
 141 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 414, 433 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 380. 
 143 Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 
(1982). 
 144 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984). 
 145 See Wait, supra note 65, at 223–24, 226–27. 
 146 See supra Part I.C.1. 
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decision.147  Two years later, in Globe Newspaper,148 the Court “clarified and 
strengthened the [First Amendment] right of access [previously] announced in 
Richmond,”149 and its decision won the support of five Justices and a special 
concurrence by Justice O’Connor.150  Globe Newspaper arose out of the 
closure of the trial of a defendant charged with the rape of three teenage 
girls.151  During pretrial motion hearings and throughout the trial, until the 
defendant’s acquittal, the courtroom was closed pursuant to a Massachusetts 
law that required the exclusion of the public and the press while testimony is 
given by a victim under the age of eighteen in a sex offense trial.152  The 
statute stated that in a trial for the rape of a minor, “the presiding justice shall 
exclude the general public from the court room, admitting only such persons as 
may have a direct interest in the case.”153 
In finding the statute unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, the 
five-Justice majority placed particular emphasis on the “functional” character 
and societal benefits of open criminal trials.154  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Brennan reiterated the same arguments about the openness of criminal 
trials contained in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence.155  But Justice 
Brennan took the majority in Globe Newspaper further, applying strict scrutiny 
to hold for the first time in the context of the closure of a criminal trial that 
where “the State attempts to deny the right of access . . . it must be shown that 
the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”156  Moreover, the “compelling 
interest” must be established on a case-by-case basis.157 
 
 147 Jeanne L. Nowaczewski, Comment, The First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 286, 288–89 (1984) (“The multiplicity of views 
represented in the seven separate opinions in Richmond left the newly established right of access largely 
undefined.”). 
 148 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 149 Nowaczewski, supra note 147, at 289. 
 150 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 597.  Chief Justice Burger was joined only by Justice Rehnquist in his 
dissent.  Id.  Justice Stevens dissented principally on the ground that he found the Court’s decision “advisory, 
hypothetical, and, at best, premature.”  Id. at 620, 623 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 151 Id. at 598 (majority opinion). 
 152 Id. at 598–99. 
 153 Id. at 598 n.1 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981), which the Court invalidated 
in this same opinion). 
 154 Nowaczewski, supra note 147, at 291–92. 
 155 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]pen 
trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic government.”). 
 156 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07. 
 157 Id. at 608 n.20. 
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Unlike Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, where the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial was invoked to justify closure (successfully under the Sixth 
Amendment in Gannett, and unsuccessfully under the First Amendment in 
Richmond Newspapers), the trial court in Globe Newspaper relied on an 
altogether different rationale for closure: the state’s desire to prevent undue 
psychological harm to child victims of sexual offenses who must testify at 
trial.158 
While the majority agreed that these interests could certainly be 
compelling, it held the Massachusetts mandatory trial closure statute 
unconstitutional159 and required a case-by-case balancing of interests.160  Thus, 
when making findings to support closure of the courtroom in a sex abuse trial, 
the court should consider, among other things, “the minor victim’s age, 
psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires 
of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.”161  The “compelling 
interest” requirement and the mandate for specific findings announced in 
Globe Newspaper162 thereby laid the foundation for the four-part test 
articulated in Waller.  However, before deciding Waller, the Court further 
refined the standard for courtroom closure under the First Amendment once 
more and extended the right of public access to criminal trials to voir dire. 
4. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court163 involved the closure of the 
courtroom to the press and public during all but three days of a six-week voir 
dire proceeding for the trial of a defendant charged with the “interracial sexual 
attack and murder” of a fifteen year-old girl.164  Unlike the divided decisions in 
Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers, all nine Justices agreed for the 
first time165 that the public right of access to criminal trials—in this case, voir 
 
 158 Id. at 600 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 401 N.E.2d 360, 369 (Mass. 1980), vacated, 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 449 U.S. 894 (1980)). 
 159 Id. at 602. 
 160 Id. at 608 n.20 (“Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested that individualized 
determinations are always required before the right of access may be denied: ‘Absent an overriding interest 
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.’” (quoting Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581)). 
 161 Id. at 608 (footnote omitted). 
 162 Id. at 607–08. 
 163 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
 164 Id. at 521 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). 
 165 Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion.  Id. at 502.  Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote 
separate concurring opinions.  Id.  Justice Marshall wrote a special concurrence, agreeing with the judgment 
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dire proceedings, which the Court held “presumptively [to have] been a public 
process”166—is found in the First Amendment.167 
Here, in a highly charged criminal proceeding, the trial court justified the 
closure during voir dire by citing the defendant’s right to a fair trial, as well as 
the right to privacy of some jurors who had “special experiences in sensitive 
areas that do not appear to be appropriate for public discussion.”168  In holding 
the closure unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, the Court articulated 
the framework that would become the basis for the four-part Waller test: 
The presumption of openness may be overcome only [(1)] by an 
overriding interest [(2)] based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is [(3)] narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.  The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific 
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure 
order was properly entered.169 
In support of its holding, the Court cited many of the same arguments 
raised in Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers: the historical practice 
of open trials in England and Colonial America,170 as well as the “community 
therapeutic value”171 of public proceedings, which “vindicate the concerns of 
the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to 
account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected.”172  
Justice Stevens also emphasized the structural benefit of open trials and 
reiterated the argument from Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Globe 
Newspaper that “the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual 
 
but refusing to join the opinion because he felt the majority had made “gratuitous comments concerning the 
length of voir dire proceedings” and failed to appreciate the racially charged nature of the case.  Id. at 521–22 
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).  Although Justice Rehnquist had filed the lone dissent in Richmond 
Newspapers and joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Globe Newspaper—and sided with the five-member 
majority in Gannett in holding that the public does not have an independent right under either the Sixth or the 
Fourteenth Amendment to attend criminal trials—Justice Rehnquist voted with the majority in Press-
Enterprise to uphold the right of public access to criminal trials.  Id. at 502 (majority opinion); see also 
discussion supra Part I.C.1–3. 
 166 Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 505 (majority opinion). 
 167 See id. at 509 n.8 (“[T]he question we address—whether the voir dire process must be open—focuses 
on First . . . Amendment values and the historical backdrop against which the First Amendment was 
enacted.”); id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 168 Id. at 504 (majority opinion) (quoting the trial court judge) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169 Id. at 510. 
 170 Id. at 505 (“[A]t the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England 
had long been presumptively open.” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 
(1980) (plurality opinion))). 
 171 Id. at 508. 
 172 Id. at 509. 
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citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican form of 
self-government.”173 
In a special concurrence, Justice Marshall reiterated the requirement that 
Justice Brennan articulated in Globe Newspaper, stating that any closure must 
be narrowly tailored: “[P]rior to issuing a closure order, a trial court should be 
obliged to show that the order in question constitutes the least restrictive 
means available for protecting compelling state interests.”174  Marshall’s 
language in Press-Enterprise thus reinforced the importance of strict scrutiny, 
which would be incorporated as the second element of the four-part Waller 
test: Any closure must be “no broader than necessary to protect” the state’s 
overriding interest justifying the closure.175 
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PUBLIC TRIAL GUARANTEE: WALLER V. GEORGIA 
AND THE RULES OF STRUCTURAL AND HARMLESS ERROR 
[T]he settled rule of the federal courts [is] that a showing of 
prejudice is not necessary for reversal of a conviction not had in 
public proceedings. 
—Levine v. United States176 
Part I of this Comment discussed the origin of the public trial right, the 
competing interests that courts must balance when deciding to close the 
courtroom, and the Supreme Court’s rationale in establishing guidelines to 
protect First Amendment interests in the event of courtroom closure.  Part II 
discusses how these guidelines were adopted in the context of the Sixth 
Amendment public trial right in Waller v. Georgia.  This Comment argues that 
trial and appellate courts too often err by approving wrongful courtroom 
closures, and that corrective action is needed to properly enforce the public 
trial right and protect the important underlying values at stake.  This Part 
advances that argument by explaining why violation of the public trial right is 
considered “structural error” requiring reversal, and how the doctrine of 
harmless error applies to violations of some constitutional rights, especially 
violations of the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
 
 173 Id. at 517–18 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 
(1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 174 Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). 
 175 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). 
 176 362 U.S. 610, 627 n.* (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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A. Waller v. Georgia and the Sixth Amendment: Violation of the Public Trial 
Guarantee Is Never Harmless 
In holding that “the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no 
less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the 
press and public,”177 Waller succinctly synthesized the Court’s prior 
jurisprudence to arrive at a coherent set of rules for uniformly enforcing the 
public trial right under both the First and Sixth Amendments.178  Decided by a 
unanimous Court in May 1984, Waller v. Georgia ruled unconstitutional the 
closure of a seven-day suppression hearing as part of the criminal trial of 
thirty-seven defendants charged with illegal gambling.179  In so doing, Waller 
established the process that trial courts must follow before closing a courtroom 
in light of a defendant’s right to a public trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments180: 
[(1)] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an 
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [(2)] the closure 
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [(3)] the 
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the 
proceeding, and [(4)] it must make findings adequate to support the 
closure.181 
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell182 reiterated the observation made 
by constitutional scholar Thomas Cooley that “[t]he requirement of a public 
trial is for the benefit of the accused.”183  Justice Powell was careful to note, 
however, that the right to an open trial must be balanced against other interests, 
such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in 
preventing disclosure of sensitive information.184  While Justice Powell 
 
 177 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. 
 178 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Presley v. Georgia, a case involving the constitutionality of 
courtroom closure during voir dire under the Sixth Amendment, “[t]he extent to which the First and Sixth 
Amendment public trial rights are coextensive is an open question . . . . [but] there is no legitimate  
reason . . . to give one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on public proceedings 
than the accused has.”  78 U.S.L.W. 4051, 4052 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (per curiam). 
 179 Chandler, supra note 15, at 802–04. 
 180 Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (“[U]nder the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing over the 
objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors.”). 
 181 Id. at 48 (citing Press-Enter. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984)). 
 182 Justice Powell did not participate in the Richmond Newspapers decision, but he voted with the 
majority in support of a qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal trials in both Globe Newspaper 
and Press-Enterprise.  See discussion supra Part I.C.3–4. 
 183 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 184 Id. at 45. 
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anticipated that courtroom closures would be rare, he cautioned that “the 
balance of interests must be struck with special care.”185  Thus, under Waller, 
the party seeking the closure has the burden of demonstrating the overriding 
interest at stake and proving the closure is no broader than necessary.186  The 
trial court must also explore reasonable alternatives and, if ordering closure, 
make adequate findings in support of its decision.187  As the North Dakota 
Supreme Court explained, the findings requirement is not imposed “merely to 
give the reviewing court something to review,” but to demonstrate that the trial 
court carefully weighed the competing interests before ordering closure.188 
Waller not only gave new guidance to trial judges considering courtroom 
closure, it unequivocally instructed appellate courts that they could not review 
any failure to follow the four-part test using harmless error analysis.189  The 
Court’s holding that “[t]he defendant should not be required to prove specific 
prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee” 
was not particularly new, however.190  The logic for holding that a defendant 
need not prove he was actually harmed by excluding the public was articulated 
more than a century ago by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. 
Murray.191  In that case, the defendant was charged with murdering a police 
officer, and the trial judge stationed a police officer at the courtroom door with 
orders to exclude all but “respectable citizens.”192  The defendant’s attorney 
protested to no avail that “the talk around town is that this trial is a sort of star-
chamber proceeding.”193  In ordering a new trial and holding that the trial 
 
 185 Id. 
 186 Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 48). 
 187 Id.; see also Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 511 (“Even with findings adequate to support closure, the trial 
court’s orders denying access to voir dire testimony failed to consider whether alternatives were available to 
protect the interests of the prospective jurors that the trial court’s orders sought to guard.”); Presley v. Georgia, 
78 U.S.L.W. 4051, 4052 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (per curiam) (“The conclusion that trial courts are required to 
consider alternatives to closure . . . is clear . . . from this Court’s precedents . . . .”). 
 188 State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798, 801 (N.D. 1989). 
 189 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (observing 
that, according to Waller, violation of the public trial right is one of a “very limited class of cases” that 
constitutes structural error); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (explaining that a structural 
error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the 
trial process itself”); Judd, 250 F.3d at 1314–15 (“[A] violation of one’s right to a public trial is structural 
error. . . . [and] structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
 190 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (“‘[T]he settled rule of the federal courts [is] that a showing of prejudice is 
not necessary for reversal of a conviction not had in public proceedings.’” (quoting Levine v. United States, 
362 U.S. 610, 627 n.* (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
 191 50 N.W. 995 (Mich. 1891). 
 192 Id. at 996, 997. 
 193 Id. 
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court’s mistake was not subject to harmless error analysis, the court announced 
that it disagreed with the proposition that the defendant bears the burden of 
showing actual injury when he is deprived of a public trial, stating: 
[W]hen [the defendant] shows that his constitutional right has been 
violated, the law conclusively presumes that he has suffered an actual 
injury.  I go further, and say that the whole body politic suffers an 
actual injury when a constitutional safeguard erected to protect the 
rights of citizens has been violated in the person of the humblest or 
meanest citizen of the state.  The [C]onstitution does not stop to 
inquire of what the person has been accused or what crime he has 
perpetrated; but it accords to all, without question, a fair, impartial, 
and public trial.194 
Murray is a nineteenth century state court opinion, but the Supreme Court, 
which has since developed a more detailed rationale for sorting out which 
constitutional violations are subject to harmless error analysis and which are 
not, has consistently treated the public trial right as non-harmless, structural 
error.195  To better understand the doctrines of harmless and structural error, 
and where violations of the public trial right sit within each—and to lay the 
groundwork for the discussion that follows about the application of the plain 
error rule to violations of Waller—it is helpful to review the modern history of 
the harmless error doctrine. 
B. “Impregnable Citadels of Technicality”: The Evolution of the Harmless 
Error Doctrine and Its Application to Constitutional Error 
The harmless error rule, codified at Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance 
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”196  Judicial 
reformers advocated the adoption of earlier versions of the rule in state and 
federal courts in the early twentieth century in response to appellate courts 
invoking seemingly minor technicalities to overturn lower court decisions.197  
 
 194 Id. at 999. 
 195 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 196 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
 197 In 1919, Congress amended section 269 of the Judiciary Code, declaring that: 
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial in any case, civil 
or criminal, the court shall give judgment, after an examination of the entire record before the 
court, without regard to technical errors or defects or to exceptions which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
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As noted by Justice Harlan in Chapman v. California,198 prior to the adoption 
of the harmless error rule, “most American appellate courts, concerned about 
the harshness of criminal penalties, followed the rule imposed on English 
courts . . . and held that any error of substance required a reversal of 
conviction.”199 
Led by authorities such as Roscoe Pound200 and Judge Learned Hand, the 
reform movement prompted courts to “discontinue using reversal as a 
‘necessary’ remedy for particular errors and ‘to substitute judgment for the 
automatic application of rules . . . .’”201  In Kotteakos v. United States,202 the 
Supreme Court observed that the driving force behind the introduction of the 
federal harmless error rule was the 
widespread and deep conviction . . . . that courts of review “tower 
above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of 
technicality.”  So great was the threat of reversal, in many 
jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible 
error in the record, only to have repeated the same matching of wits 
when a new trial had been thus obtained.203 
Reformers agreed that a harmless error rule would restore public 
confidence in the criminal trial process by focusing appellate courts “on the 
underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence 
of immaterial error.”204  However, disregarding harmless error without 
 
Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 126, 147 (1927) (quoting the amended 
section 269 of the Judicial Code); see also An Act to Codify, Revise, and Amend the Laws Relating to the 
Judiciary, Pub. L. No. 281, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (1919).  Sunderland also observed, “About eighteen states 
have adopted similar legislation.  About nine or ten states have reached the same result by judicial action.  
Almost a dozen states adhere more or less closely to the technical rule of presumed prejudice.”  Sunderland, 
supra. 
 198 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
 199 Id. at 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN 
AMERICA 190 (1939). 
 200 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM. LAW. 
445, 450 (1906) (asserting that “the worst feature of American procedure is the lavish granting of new trials,” 
and contrasting the granting of new trials in American courts with the English Court of Appeal, which grants 
new trials in only “about three percent of the cases reviewed”). 
 201 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 48–49 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting 4 BARRON, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2571 (1965)). 
 202 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
 203 Id. at 759 (footnote omitted) (quoting Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of 
Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)); see also Johnson v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 189, 202 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To turn a criminal appeal into a quest for error 
no more promotes the ends of justice than to acquiesce in low standards of criminal prosecution.”). 
 204 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). 
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undermining important principles of justice is no simple task.  As the 
distinguished California jurist Roger J. Traynor colorfully observed: 
Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through it in 
swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession.  Many are 
plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful.  Some, for all the 
benign appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague 
of followers that deplete trials of fairness.205 
Despite the adoption of the federal harmless error rule in 1919, most 
constitutional errors in the first half of the twentieth century were still seen as 
affecting “the substantial rights of the parties,”206 and thus continued to be 
regarded as so grave that they required automatic reversal.207  This framework 
changed dramatically in 1967, however, with the landmark case of Chapman v. 
California, in which the Supreme Court fashioned what it termed the 
“harmless-constitutional-error rule.”208 
In Chapman, the appellants had been charged with robbery, kidnapping, 
and murder, but chose not to testify at trial.209  The prosecutor commented 
extensively on their silence and won a conviction.210  Although implying a 
defendant’s guilt from his refusal to testify was permitted under the California 
constitution at the time,211 the California Supreme Court found that the 
prosecutor violated Chapman’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.212  
The court upheld the convictions, however, on the ground that the prosecutor’s 
comments were merely harmless error.213 
In their appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Chapman appellants urged 
the Court to adopt a rule that “all federal constitutional errors, regardless of the 
facts and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful” and thus require 
 
 205 ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR, at ix (1970). 
 206 Supra note 197. 
 207 Edwards, supra note 5, at 1175–76; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42 (1967) (Stewart, 
J., concurring in result) (“[I]n a long line of cases, involving a variety of constitutional claims in both state and 
federal prosecutions, this Court has steadfastly rejected any notion that constitutional violations might be 
disregarded on the ground that they were ‘harmless.’  Illustrations of the principle are legion.”). 
 208 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22; see also Gary C. Horner, Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—Harmless 
Constitutional Error—Chapman v. California, 87 Sup. Ct. 824 (1967), 71 DICK. L. REV. 686 (1967). 
 209 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18–19. 
 210 Id. at 26–42. 
 211 The U.S. Supreme Court later ruled this practice unconstitutional.  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 
615 (1965). 
 212 Chapman, 328 U.S. at 20. 
 213 People v. Teal, 404 P.2d 209, 220–21 (Cal. 1965), rev’d sub nom. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1967). 
LEVITAS GALLEYSFINAL 6/9/2010  2:49 PM 
2009] SCALING WALLER 523 
automatic reversal.214  The Court rejected this proposal, holding instead that 
“there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular 
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may . . . be deemed 
harmless, [and] not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.”215  
Writing for the eight-Justice majority, Justice Black observed that review of 
federal constitutional errors is a federal question216 and declared: 
Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed 
to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as 
much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional 
provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they 
have been denied.  With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the 
States, we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the 
authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people 
from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights.217 
Even as the Court in Chapman significantly broadened application of the 
harmless error rule to federal constitutional errors, it nevertheless recognized 
that some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their violation can 
never be treated as harmless error.218  Such errors invalidate the conviction of 
even an obviously guilty defendant because “[w]ithout these basic protections, 
a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination 
of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as 
fundamentally fair.”219 
Arizona v. Fulminante, decided in 1991, further formalized this dichotomy, 
dividing constitutional errors into two categories: trial errors and structural 
errors.220  The former are subject to harmless error analysis because they 
“‘occur[] during presentation of the case to the jury’ and their effect may ‘be 
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to 
 
 214 Chapman, 328 U.S. at 21–22. 
 215 Id. at 22. 
 216 Id. at 18, 21 (noting, also, that “[t]he application of a state harmless-error rule is . . . a state question 
where it involves only errors of state procedure or state law”). 
 217 Id. at 21.  But see id. at 46–47 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court has no “general 
supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 218 Id. at 23 (majority opinion). 
 219 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 220 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–11 (1991). 
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determine whether they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”221  The 
latter are deemed “structural defects”222 because they “affect[] the framework 
within which the trial proceeds . . . [and are not] simply . . . error[s] in the trial 
process itself.”223  Errors of this type are regarded as “so intrinsically harmful 
as to require automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect on the 
outcome.”224  The assignment of the structural error label also rests “upon the 
difficulty of assessing the effect of the error,”225 which makes a determination 
of harmlessness nearly impossible, and thus improper.226  Structural errors 
include: a judge entering judgment of conviction in a jury-based criminal trial 
or directing “the jury to come forward with such a verdict;”227 denial of the 
right to counsel;228 the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race 
from the grand jury that indicted him (regardless of “overwhelming evidence 
of his guilt”);229 denial of the right to trial by an impartial judge;230 and denial 
of the right to a public trial.231 
Under the rubric of structural error, a courtroom closure that violates 
Waller is not subject to harmless error analysis because it would be extremely 
difficult for a defendant to come up with evidence of specific injury resulting 
from an improper closure.232  After all, if the public is excluded from the 
 
 221 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148, 149 n.4 (2006) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 
307–08) (dividing constitutional error into two comprehensive categories, “trial error” and “structural defects” 
and specifically citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984), to illustrate the latter). 
 222 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148. 
 223 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 
 224 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). 
 225 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4. 
 226 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (“‘[Where] demonstration of prejudice . . . is a practical impossibility, 
prejudice must necessarily be implied.’” (quoting State v. Sheppard, 438 A.2d 125, 128 (Conn. 1980))).  The 
difficulty of assessing harm is not, however, the only test.  The irrelevance of harmlessness also can lead to 
designation of structural error.  See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (“Since the right 
to self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome 
unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis.”). 
 227 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 294 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that such convictions would be invalidated 
“‘regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction’” (quoting United States v. 
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1977))). 
 228 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 
(1984) (“Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in 
prejudice. . . .  Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not 
worth the cost.”). 
 229 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 294 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)). 
 230 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (requiring automatic reversal when a judge with a financial 
interest in the outcome of the case presides over the defendant’s criminal trial). 
 231 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 
 232 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (“[A] requirement that prejudice be shown ‘would in 
most cases deprive [the defendant] of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in 
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courtroom it is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate how the presence of 
spectators would have deterred perjury, curbed judicial abuse, or advanced the 
cause of republican self-government.  As the Court explained in Waller, 
“[w]hile the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to 
prove, or a matter of chance, the Framers plainly thought them nonetheless 
real.”233 
The strength of the rule that violation of the public trial right is always 
structural error is reinforced by the fact that over the past forty years the Court 
has steadily eroded the rule of reversal as applied to other constitutional 
errors,234 but has not done so where violations of Waller are concerned.  For 
example, the Court has expanded harmless error analysis to apply to violations 
of the Confrontation Clause,235 admission of coerced confessions,236 and a host 
of other constitutional violations.237  Notably, the Court has done so while 
repeatedly reaffirming that any violation of the public trial right still remains 
structural error.238  And recently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,239 where 
the Court declared that violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of 
choice is structural error, the Court cited Waller to illustrate that its 
“conclusion of structural error [still rests] upon the difficulty of assessing the 
effect of the error.”240 
The law is clear that a violation of the public trial right can never be 
assessed under the rubric of harmless error.  However, as demonstrated by 
 
which he would have evidence available of specific injury.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex 
rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (1969))). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 652 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“By now it goes without saying that harmless-error review is of almost 
universal application; there are few errors that may not be forgiven as harmless.”); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 
306 (“[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.”); Edwards, supra note 5, at 1186 (“[T]he Court’s decision 
in Chapman heralded a major expansion in both the number of violations subject to harmless-error analysis 
and the frequency with which that analysis is employed.”). 
 235 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 250 (1969) (finding harmless error because of the 
“overwhelming” evidence against the defendant when a trial judge admitted the confessions of three co-
defendants but two of the defendants never took the witness stand). 
 236 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308; see also United States v. Daniel, 932 F.2d 517, 518, 521–22 (6th Cir. 
1991) (holding harmless the coerced statement of a defendant after he and others were forced to lie down on 
the floor, handcuffed, with their heads covered by a sheet while police executed a search without an arrest 
warrant or probable cause for the seizure because a later voluntary confession provided the same information); 
Edwards, supra note 5, at 1196–97. 
 237 For a comprehensive list, see Edwards, supra note 5, at 1177 n.33. 
 238 See infra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 239 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 240 Id. at 149 n.4. 
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Craven v. State, some appellate courts will still resort to harmless error 
analysis to uphold convictions in the interest of justice for the victim, even 
when it is obvious that the trial court failed to conduct a Waller inquiry.241  The 
rule that improper closure mandates reversal is less obvious, however, in a case 
of plain error—when a trial court violates Waller, but the defendant fails to 
object. 
III.  APPLYING THE RULE OF PLAIN ERROR TO THE PUBLIC TRIAL GUARANTEE 
To invoke the protection of structural error, a defendant should properly 
object to the courtroom closure.  But what rights may a defendant assert if no 
objection is made?  This Part explains the rule of plain error and why it should 
apply to violations of Waller—an issue the Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed. 
It is essential to the goal of judicial economy that a party be required to 
make a timely objection to the actions of the court and explain the reasons for 
the objection to preserve a claim of error.242  “Failure to do so will ordinarily 
bar review of [a] defendant’s claim either on a subsequent motion or on appeal, 
except for plain error.”243  The plain error rule244 is a companion to the rule of 
harmless error and is summarily defined as error that “affects substantial rights 
[and so] may be considered [on appeal] even though it was not brought to the 
trial court’s attention.”245  Given the sparse text of the rule, it is worth 
examining how it has been interpreted to determine whether it applies to 
violations of the public trial right when no objection is made.  After all, just as 
the Court has steadily expanded application of the harmless error rule to 
constitutional violations, it has also announced that not all constitutional errors 
are subject to plain error review.246  Furthermore, it is not enough for the error 
to affect a defendant’s “substantial rights.”  As the language of the rule 
 
 241 Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“In this case, while the trial court erred in 
removing Craven’s family from the courtroom, the error is harmless.”), cert. denied (Oct. 27, 2008).  For a 
review of Craven, see supra Introduction. 
 242 FED. R. CRIM. P. 51; see also 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 841–43 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing Rule 51 and related cases). 
 243 WRIGHT, supra note 242, at 443 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 244 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
 245 Id. 
 246 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this 
Court than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil 
cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’” 
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944))). 
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suggests, the defendant must also show that the error “seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”247  As this Part 
will show, the Court’s adoption of the “fairness, integrity or public reputation” 
element of the plain error test lends further weight to the argument that 
violations of the public trial right must be subject to plain error review. 
Decided in 1993, United States v. Olano established a four-part test for 
federal appellate courts to determine whether an error without objection is 
worthy of plain error review248: First, there must be error—the violation of a 
legal rule that was not waived, despite the defendant’s failure to object.249  
Second, the error must be “plain.”250  Third, it must have affected substantial 
rights.251  And fourth, despite the discretionary character of the plain error 
rule,252 appellate courts “should correct a plain, forfeited error affecting 
substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”253 
What is the relationship between harmless error and plain error?  If the 
Court has held that an error violates a defendant’s “substantial rights” and 
therefore is not harmless under Rule 52(a), does the error satisfy the 
“substantial rights” component of the plain error test of 52(b)?  The answer is 
yes,254 although under the plain error rule “[i]t is the defendant rather than the 
Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to [proving] 
prejudice.”255 
The plain error rule demands a remedy for an improper courtroom closure, 
even when no objection was made.  As previously discussed, the Court has 
 
 247 Olano, 507 U.S at 736 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 
(1936)). 
 248 Id. at 732–37; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). 
 249 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733–34 (“Waiver is different from forfeiture.  Whereas forfeiture is the failure to 
make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))). 
 250 Id. at 734 (defining “plain” to mean “‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious’”). 
 251 Id. at 734–35. 
 252 Id. at 735. 
 253 Id. at 736 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 
160 (1936)). 
 254 Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The phrase ‘substantial rights’ appears twice in Rule 52: once in 
Rule 52(a), which describes the harmless-error rule, and again in Rule 52(b), in connection with the plain-error 
rule.  Presumably, the words have the same meaning each time they are used.” (citation omitted)); see also 
WRIGHT, supra note 242, at 498 (“This is the same language that is used in defining ‘harmless error’ in Rule 
52(a), and the same kind of inquiry is called for under each branch of Rule 52 . . . .”). 
 255 Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 
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adopted a per se rule of structural error for violations of the public trial right.256  
If a courtroom is closed in violation of the requirements of Waller, prejudice is 
automatically presumed—the error is deemed structural, not harmless—and a 
violation of substantial rights has occurred.  Under this logic, the defendant has 
no “burden” to shoulder, and the burden-shifting element of the plain error rule 
is irrelevant.  The Supreme Court has not decided whether the plain error rule 
applies to a violation of Waller when the defendant fails to object, but in 
Johnson v. United States, a leading case discussing the plain error rule, the 
Court explicitly cites Waller to illustrate that the rule applies to the “very 
limited class of cases” where there is structural error, thus implicating 
substantial rights.257  Dicta aside, a bona fide structural error harms substantial 
rights, and thus will automatically pass the third element of the four-part test of 
Rule 52(b), enumerated above. 
If an improper courtroom closure meets the first three parts of the plain 
error test—it is (1) error that has not been waived, (2) which is “plain,” and (3) 
has affected substantial rights—the next question is whether the error affects 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.258  If it does, is 
reversal then required under the plain error rule?259  Here, the answer must also 
be yes, because a violation of the public trial right directly impacts the fairness, 
integrity, and public reputation of a criminal trial.  The Court has yet to decide 
this question, but according to prior opinions of the Court, an inseparable 
relationship exists between violations of the public trial right and these 
concerns.  After all, if the “searchlight” of a public trial “serves as a restraint 
against the abuse of judicial power,”260 then extinguishing it through an 
improper closure surely threatens to erode the integrity and public reputation of 
the trial. 
In overturning the secret conviction of the defendant in In re Oliver, the 
Court observed that public trials are important because “[t]he spectators learn 
 
 256 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 257 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (noting the existence of a limited class of 
cases, such as Waller, where the errors involved do affect substantial rights); see also United States v. 
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 74 (2004) (“Except for certain structural errors undermining the criminal 
proceeding’s fairness as a whole, relief for [plain] error is tied to prejudicial effect . . . .”); Deborah S. Nall, 
Comment, United States v. Booker: The Presumption of Prejudice in Plain Error Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 621, 632 n.86 (2006) (identifying violations of Waller as structural error that therefore meet the third 
prong of the four-part test of the plain error rule). 
 258 Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. 
 259 Id. 
 260 United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969). 
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about their government and acquire confidence in their judicial remedies.”261  
It would follow, then, that confidence—and with it, the public reputation of the 
courts—would suffer absent that opportunity.  Discouraging perjury by 
enabling persons with knowledge of the facts to attend a trial and possibly 
deliver relevant testimony is essential to the fairness of any criminal 
proceeding.262  Likewise, in both In re Oliver and Waller, the Court 
incorporated the public trial right under the Fourteenth Amendment, using a 
test based on fairness principles.263  Thus, the fourth prong of the plain error 
test is satisfied because an improper closure clearly affects “the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”264 
Additionally, it should be noted that some commentators have observed 
that the four-part framework for assessing plain error adopted in Olano de-
emphasized the “miscarriage of justice standard”265—which stressed reversals 
only to avoid the conviction of an innocent defendant—in favor of a standard 
where “courts rather than counsel are entrusted with insuring the fairness, 
integrity, and public reputation of the judicial process.”266  As Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion explained, a plain error may warrant reversal 
regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defendant because of the error’s 
effect on the fairness of the trial.267  Additionally, as argued above, violations 
of the public trial right especially implicate the fairness, integrity, and public 
reputation of criminal proceedings.  Any further emphasis on these factors 
created by the holding in Olano thus lends even greater weight to finding plain 
error when courtroom exclusions are improper and the defendant fails to object 
without conscious waiver. 
In many cases, improper courtroom closures can be easily distinguished 
from those constitutional violations that are harmless error and not covered by 
the plain error rule.  The determination of plain error in most cases depends on 
a showing of prejudice,268 and if the constitutional error is one that the 
 
 261 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948) (citing 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d 
ed. 1940)). 
 262 See discussion supra note 60. 
 263 See discussion supra Parts I.A.1, II.A. 
 264 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). 
 265 Jeffrey L. Lowry, Plain Error Rule—Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1084 (1994); see also Edwards, supra note 
5, at 1185, 1203–04. 
 266 Lowry, supra note 265, at 1081. 
 267 Olano, 507 U.S. at 736; see also Lowry, supra note 265, at 1073. 
 268 See WRIGHT, supra note 242, at 501 (“In most claims of plain error, the outcome turns on whether or 
not prejudice can be demonstrated.”). 
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Supreme Court considers harmless,269 then the plain error rule will not apply.  
However, because violations of Waller are per se structural errors, it is easy to 
see how they fall within the ambit of plain error.  This is only true provided 
that the Waller violation is deemed to meet the fourth element of the plain 
error test, as this Comment argues.  As for other structural constitutional errors, 
whether the plain error rule applies will also rest on an assessment under the 
fourth prong of the plain error test. 
Thus, a courtroom closure that violates Waller, and that is neither objected 
nor consented to, is almost sure to meet the plain error test and require reversal 
because (1) a legal rule has been violated without waiver; (2) such errors are 
certainly obvious; (3) violations of Waller are structural errors and clearly 
implicate substantial rights; and (4) such violations “necessarily render a trial 
fundamentally unfair.”270  Furthermore, the error at issue represents just the 
kind of defect that seriously impacts the “integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings,” thus meeting the requirements of Olano.271 
However, as demonstrated by Craven v. State, discussed in the 
Introduction, it is difficult to persuade appellate courts to invoke the rule of 
plain error in child sex abuse cases where evidence of guilt is substantial.272  In 
Craven, the Georgia Court of Appeals not only applied harmless error to 
uphold the closure at issue, but it also announced that Craven had waived any 
constitutional claim he might have had because he did not object to the 
exclusion of his relatives from the courtroom until after his stepdaughter had 
testified.273 
Georgia courts are not alone in failing to apply plain error review to 
violations of Waller.  In People v. Priola, the defendant was convicted in 
Illinois state court of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of an eight-year-old 
girl.274  The courtroom was closed during the victim’s testimony, but the 
defendant failed to object.  The closure violated Waller and also was later 
deemed illegal under Illinois law.275  Although the Illinois Court of Appeals 
 
 269 For discussions of Chapman and Fulminante, see supra Part II.B. 
 270 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986). 
 271 Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 272 For a summary of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, see supra note 22. 
 273 Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); see also supra notes 25–27 and 
accompanying text. 
 274 561 N.E.2d 82, 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 275 Id. at 96. 
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found that the trial court failed to make findings of fact or consider alternatives 
before closing the courtroom, it declined to apply plain error,276 saying that the 
evidence against the defendant was not “closely balanced,” and the error was 
not serious enough to deprive him of a fair trial.277 
This decision may have achieved justice for the victim, but it ignored the 
constitutional requirements of Waller and did not properly apply the plain error 
rule.  The Waller violation was structural error, so any inquiry into the 
“balance” of the evidence was inappropriately akin to harmless error 
analysis278 and should not have been part of the court’s plain error inquiry.  
Addressing the issue of fairness under its plain error inquiry, the court simply 
announced that because “most of the trial was open to the public and the media 
was not excluded from any portion of the trial,” the plain error rule did not 
apply.279  However, if one of the goals of a public trial is to encourage 
witnesses to come forward and to discourage perjury (as even the Illinois Court 
of Appeals acknowledged),280 any improper closure has the potential to 
undermine these goals because it is impossible to know how the exclusion of 
unknown persons may have impacted the proceeding.  It is exactly this 
uncertainty that led the Supreme Court to declare that violations of Waller 
always constitute structural error.  The same logic also suggests that such errors 
sufficiently implicate the fairness and integrity of the trial to justify applying 
plain error, even if it is impossible to know exactly how the improper closure 
may have affected any particular case.281 
Another example of a state court’s failure to apply the plain error rule can 
be found in State v. Smith, where the defendant was accused of multiple sexual 
offenses involving his daughter, a minor.282  The trial judge closed the 
courtroom in response to the prosecutor’s request under North Carolina law, 
and the defendant contended that the trial court failed to make findings of fact 
prior to the closure.283  However, because the judge “spent ample time 
 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 96–98. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. at 97. 
 280 Id. 
 281 See Watters v. State, 612 A.2d 1288, 1292–93 (Md. 1992) (‘“Indeed, the barring of spectators would 
make it impossible for the unknown individual to stray into the courtroom and reveal his information bearing 
on the case.  To require proof of this by the defendant would be ironically to enforce against him the necessity 
to prove what the disregard of his constitutional right has made it impossible for him to learn.”’ (quoting 
United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir. 1969))). 
 282 636 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
 283 Id. at 275. 
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questioning people who were in the courtroom [about] specifically why they 
were there” before ordering the closure, and because the defendant’s lawyer 
“had an opportunity to object to or comment on the clearing of the courtroom” 
but failed to do so, the appellate court deemed the defendant had consented to 
clearing the courtroom.284  Thus, according to the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals, no findings were required and no constitutional error occurred.285 
As in Priola, the court here seemed reluctant to order a new trial because 
doing so would be unfair to the victim in light of the significant evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt.286  But guilty defendants are still entitled to a full application 
of the plain error rule, and manufacturing “consent” to extinguish a 
constitutional claim hardly contributes to the fairness, integrity, and public 
reputation of a criminal trial, even if the goal is to achieve the “right result” in 
any particular case.  As Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, “it is an abuse 
to deal too casually and too lightly with rights guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution, even though they . . . may be invoked by those morally 
unworthy.”287 
IV.  A PARADE OF ERRORS: THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE PUBLIC TRIAL 
RIGHT 
The previous Part argued for application of the plain error rule to violations 
of Waller and described how some courts resist reversing convictions in spite 
of improper courtroom closures and how they sometimes manufacture 
“consent” by the defendant to avoid invoking plain error.  This Part examines 
other key errors committed by trial and appellate courts when they fail to 
follow or enforce Waller, among them: (1) employing post hoc rationales to 
justify closure when trial courts neglect to make the requisite findings; (2) 
either failing to properly balance the interests at stake or applying a doctrine of 
“partial closure” to suggest that a lesser “substantial interest” is required to 
justify closure instead of the “overriding interest” mandated by Waller; (3) 
asserting that state trial closure statutes provide a sufficient proxy for the 
Waller test; (4) holding that failure to follow the state trial closure statute is 
 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 See id. at 270 (detailing testimony by the victim about multiple incidents of abuse and attempted abuse 
by the defendant, as well as corroborating statements made by the victim to her former minister and to a child 
protective service worker). 
 287 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953). 
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irrelevant because the law is “for the benefit of the victim;” and (5) simply 
disregarding the requirements of Waller altogether. 
A. Employing Post Hoc Rationales to Justify Closure 
Courts often employ post hoc rationales justifying closure despite the plain 
language of Waller that forbids it.288  In State v. Anderson, a criminal sexual 
misconduct case involving a five-year-old victim, a Minnesota trial court 
ordered the courtroom closed during a hearing in chambers with counsel 
present, but the exchange “was not recorded, and the court ha[d] no clear 
memory of the discussion.”289  Despite the state court of appeals’s 
acknowledgement that a trial court must “articulate its findings with specificity 
and detail supporting the need for closure,” it found no error because the 
prosecuting attorney’s post hoc recollections included “many but possibly not 
all of [the] reasons” that had originally been articulated in favor of closure, 
even though the defendant’s lawyer disagreed.290 
In United States v. Farmer, the Eighth Circuit held that “specific findings 
by the district court are not necessary if we can glean sufficient support for a 
partial temporary closure from the record.”291  And in Bowden v. Keane, the 
Second Circuit echoed this sentiment when it announced that “Waller’s fourth 
prong is satisfied when ‘information’ that supports the closure can be  
‘gleaned’ . . . from the record developed by the trial court.”292  It is difficult to 
see how these holdings square with the strong language of Waller, which 
explicitly rejects post hoc findings,293 and the mandate of Globe Newspaper 
and Richmond Newspapers for individualized determinations articulated in 
findings prior to closure.294  However, in the absence of corrective guidance by 
the Supreme Court, post hoc findings are likely to remain attractive to 
appellate courts in some cases, especially those involving child victims where 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt seems overwhelming. 
 
 288 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.8 (1984) (“The post hoc assertion by the Georgia Supreme Court 
that the trial court balanced petitioners’ right to a public hearing against the privacy rights of others cannot 
satisfy the deficiencies in the trial court’s record. . . . and is itself too broad to meet the Press-Enterprise 
standard.”); see also State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798, 802 (N.D. 1989). 
 289 State v. Anderson, No. C9-96-1016, 1996 WL 665902, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1996). 
 290 Id. at *2. 
 291 32 F.3d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 292 237 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 293 Carter v. State, 738 A.2d 871, 878 (Md. 1999) (“An appellate court may not provide a post hoc 
rationale for why the trial judge would have closed the trial had it held a hearing and made findings.”). 
 294 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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B. Balancing of Interests and the Partial Closure Doctrine 
Although Waller clearly mandates a balancing of interests, trial courts often 
do a poor job of following the rule.  In People v. Holveck, for example, the 
defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting three five-year-old girls, and 
the victims testified in a closed courtroom.295  Citing Waller, the Illinois Court 
of Appeals held that the trial court had failed to engage “in the careful 
balancing of interests and the individualized evaluation of factors required” 
because the “sole reason cited by the court for the closure was the ‘unnerving 
effect’ on the children if the courtroom were crowded and wanting to make the 
unpleasant experience of testifying as pleasant as possible” for the child 
witnesses.296  It is not that courts should be unsympathetic to these concerns.  
After all, Globe Newspaper explicitly acknowledged that “safeguarding the 
physical and psychological well-being of a minor was a compelling interest 
which could support closure . . . .”297  However, such a determination must be 
made by trial courts on a case-by-case basis, and individualized determinations 
articulated in the findings are always required.298  It follows that if such 
findings are not made before excluding the public from the courtroom, the trial 
court may not rationalize its decision after the fact. 
In Woods v. Kuhlmann, the Second Circuit joined the Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits in distinguishing between “partial” and “total” closure of the 
courtroom to justify a less demanding application of Waller.299  In a partial 
 
 295 524 N.E.2d 1073, 1075–76, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 296 Id. at 1083.  But see LaPlante v. Crosby, 133 F. App’x 723, 725–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
prosecutor’s stated concern that “the child [could] testify in relative calm” satisfied the first prong of the 
Waller test because “the physical and psychological well-being of a minor” is a compelling interest justifying 
closure during a rape trial of a minor (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 
U.S. 596, 607 (1982))). 
 297 Holveck, 524 N.E.2d at 1082 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607–08). 
 298 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 581 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a 
criminal case must be open to the public.” (emphasis added)). 
 299 Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992); see, e.g., Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753–
54 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding there was no violation of defendant’s public trial right because the trial judge 
“had a substantial reason for the closure,” which the court deemed “partial”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 957 
(1989); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding only a substantial—not 
compelling—reason was required in the context of “partial closure” when only defendants’ families were 
excluded during testimony of the rape victim, a minor, who “was frightened and apprehensive of speaking 
before defendants’ family members”); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 532–33 (11th Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam) (finding that the impact of partial closure was not the same as total closure, and therefore “only a 
‘substantial’ rather than ‘compelling’ reason for the closure was necessary”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 
(1985). 
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closure, for example, only members of the defendant’s family might be 
excluded from the courtroom during the testimony of a single witness.300  In a 
total closure, supposedly exemplified by Waller, “all persons other than 
witnesses, court personnel, the parties and their lawyers [are] excluded for the 
duration of the hearing.”301  In the former instance, these circuits hold that only 
a less stringent “substantial reason” is needed to justify partial closure, not the 
overriding interest required by Waller.302  Yet, “the Supreme Court has never 
set forth a less rigorous standard for partial closures”303 and this approach also 
has been criticized by other courts.  In People v. Jones, the Court of Appeals of 
New York flatly noted: “We are aware that some courts have recognized that a 
less demanding standard can be applied to limited closure requests . . . .  We 
disagree.”304 
There is also a problem with semantics because different courts define 
“partial closure” differently.  As the Eleventh Circuit observed in Judd v. 
Haley, “partial closures” are defined as those “in which the public retains some 
(though not complete) access to a particular proceeding.”305  However, the 
court also observed that “[n]owhere does our precedent suggest that the total 
closure of a courtroom for a temporary period can be considered a partial 
closure, and analyzed as such.”306  Despite this admonition, state courts in the 
Eleventh Circuit have insisted on doing just that.307 
Labeling a closure “partial” instead of “total” makes it easier to close the 
courtroom according to some courts because only a “substantial”—and not an 
“overriding”—interest is then required to justify the exclusion of the public.308  
However, a different issue arises altogether when courts hold that partial 
closure does not require compliance with Waller at all.  It is one thing to bend 
 
 300 Woods, 977 F.2d at 74–76 (members of the defendant’s family were excluded from the courtroom after 
the victim-witness expressed concern for her safety, although members of the general public were allowed to 
remain, hence the court deemed the closure only “partial”). 
 301 Id. at 76. 
 302 Id. 
 303 Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 168 n.11 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 304 People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (N.Y. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 305 Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 306 Id. 
 307 See discussion of Goldstein v. State, 640 S.E.2d 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006), infra notes 319–20 and 
accompanying text. 
 308 See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 602 S.E.2d 312, 315 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]hen access to the courtroom is 
retained by some spectators (such as representatives of the press or the defendant’s family members), we have 
found that the impact of the closure is not as great, and not as deserving of such a rigorous level of 
constitutional scrutiny.” (citing Judd, 250 F.3d at 1315)). 
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the rules by lowering the threshold of interest required to meet the first part of 
the Waller test, but it is quite another to distinguish between partial and total 
closure in order to justify holding no hearing, making no findings of fact, and 
exploring no alternatives.  Yet this is what some courts have done.  This 
dynamic is usually seen in the context of courtroom closure pursuant to state 
mandatory trial closure statutes, as explained below. 
C. State Trial Closure Statutes as a Proxy for the Waller Test 
Although the Supreme Court declared Massachusetts’s mandatory trial 
closure statute unconstitutional in Globe Newspaper in 1992,309 it listed other 
state statutes, such as Florida’s trial closure law,310 which required exclusion of 
the general public but not the press during testimony of minor victims in sex 
abuse cases,311 but declined to address their constitutionality.  Today, Georgia 
is the only state with a mandatory closure statute nearly identical to 
Florida’s.312  As of March 2002, fourteen other states and the U.S. Code313 
permitted or required such exclusions to varying degrees.314  Although the 
Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of a state trial closure 
law since Globe Newspaper, state courts have invalidated them on Sixth 
Amendment grounds;315 upheld but construed them as requiring the application 
 
 309 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 310 FLA. STAT. § 918.16 (1979) (“In the trial of any case, civil or criminal, when any person under the age 
of 16 is testifying concerning any sex offense, the court shall clear the courtroom of all persons except parties 
to the cause and their immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their secretaries, officers of the court, 
jurors, newspaper reporters or broadcasters, and court reporters.”). 
 311 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S at 608 n.22. 
 312 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-54 (2009) (“In the trial of any criminal case, when any person under 
the age of 16 is testifying concerning any sex offense, the court shall clear the courtroom of all persons except 
parties to the cause and their immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their secretaries, officers of the 
court, jurors, newspaper reporters or broadcasters, and court reporters.”), with FLA. STAT. § 918.16(2) (2009) 
(“[I]n the trial of any case, civil or criminal, when any person under the age of 16 . . . is testifying concerning 
any sex offense, the court shall clear the courtroom of all persons except parties to the cause and their 
immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their secretaries, officers of the court, jurors, newspaper 
reporters or broadcasters, court reporters, and, at the request of the victim, victim or witness advocates 
designated by the state attorney’s office.”).  Other state statutes with mandatory closure language, such as 
Massachusetts’s trial closure law, have been construed to require a case-by-case determination whether 
“‘closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim.’”  Commonwealth v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 297, 
302 (Mass. 1994) (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S at 608); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16A. 
 313 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e) (2006). 
 314 AM. PROSECUTOR RESEARCH INST., supra note 113, at 459–62. 
 315 See Renkel v. State, 807 P.2d 1087, 1088, 1092–93 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (declaring unconstitutional 
a state mandatory trial closure law “indistinguishable from the Massachusetts mandatory closure statute” that 
the Court found unconstitutional in Globe Newspaper). 
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of Waller;316 reversed convictions where trial courts have failed to apply the 
Waller test;317 or held them to be proxies for the inquiry mandated by Waller, 
thereby relieving trial courts of the obligation to make case-by-case findings.318  
This latter class of cases is the approach that most erodes Waller. 
In Goldstein v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals found no error in what 
it termed a “temporary partial closure” during the testimony of a child 
molestation victim when the courtroom was cleared of all members of the 
public while experts for the State and the defense were allowed to remain.319  
No hearing was held and no findings were made, yet the court of appeals 
affirmed the closure as proper because Georgia’s trial closure statute was 
“based upon a legislative determination that there is a compelling state interest 
in protecting children while they are testifying concerning a sex offense,” and, 
therefore, partial closure under Georgia law does not violate a defendant’s 
public trial right.320 
Georgia is not alone.  Some Florida appellate courts have also held that the 
entire four-part test of Waller is not required when “partial closure” is ordered 
pursuant to that state’s mandatory trial closure statute.321  In Clements v. State, 
 
 316 See State v. Guajardo, 605 A.2d 217, 219 (N.H. 1992) (holding that section 632-A:8 of the New 
Hampshire Revised Statutes, which mandates in camera testimony of a sex abuse victim under sixteen unless 
good cause is shown by the defendant, must be construed in light of the Sixth Amendment and Waller’s four-
part test); State v. Robinson, No. COA07-1274, 2008 WL 2967706, at *1, *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008) 
(“In reaching a determination to close the courtroom under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-166, the court may not rely 
solely on the statute but must consider the [four] Waller factors.”); State ex rel. Stevens v. Cir. Ct., 414 
N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Wis. 1987) (holding mandatory trial closure provision unconstitutional, but adopting the 
“requirements established in Waller” to sustain the remaining discretionary closure provision of the Wisconsin 
law). 
 317 See People v. Holveck, 524 N.E.2d 1073, 1082–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding state statutory scheme 
unconstitutional as applied because the trial court failed to “engage[] in the careful balancing of interests and 
the individualized evaluation of factors required to override the defendant’s qualified Sixth Amendment right 
to a public trial”). 
 318 See, e.g., Clements v. State, 742 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.-5th 1999), dismissed per curiam, 
jurisdiction improvidently granted, 782 So. 2d 868 (2001) (holding that partial closure during child victim 
testimony in a sex offense prosecution did not require the four-factor Waller inquiry because the state 
legislature, in enacting the trial closure statute, found there is a compelling interest in protecting minor 
victims). 
 319 Goldstein v. State, 640 S.E.2d 599, 601–02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).  Goldstein’s conviction was reversed 
on other grounds.  Id. at 604–06. 
 320 Id. at 602 (citation omitted); see also supra Part IV.D. 
 321 Clements, 742 So. 2d at 341.  Contra Thornton v. State, 585 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.-2d 1991) 
(per curiam) (holding as improper the failure to apply Waller prerequisites before closing the courtroom to 
even those persons authorized under state law to be present during testimony of a minor victim in a sex offense 
prosecution); Pritchett v. State, 566 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.-2d 1990) (holding state trial closure statute 
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one Florida district court of appeal invoked the distinction between partial and 
total closure and then explained that the state legislature, by enacting the 
statute, had already made the necessary finding of compelling interest and 
drafted the statute narrowly to protect defendants’ rights.322  In addition, the 
court found that “the press, as the eyes and ears of the public, is allowed to 
remain [and thus] . . . preserves a defendant’s constitutional right to a public 
trial.”323  Therefore, no Waller inquiry was required.324 
This reasoning fails on several fronts.  First, even those federal circuits that 
have announced a lower threshold of interest in cases of partial closure still 
require compliance with all the other procedural requirements of Waller.325  
Second, the argument that a state statute can be a substitute for the kind of 
particularized findings required by Waller is plainly wrong.  Nearly thirty 
years ago in Richmond Newspapers, the Court announced that no closure was 
proper without the articulation of an overriding interest in “evidentiary 
findings.”326  In Press-Enterprise, the Court said these findings must be 
“specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure 
order was properly entered.”327  If a post hoc inquiry is too broad to provide 
the record needed to “balance[] petitioners’ right to a public hearing against the 
privacy rights of others,”328 then it can hardly be said that a preemptive 
legislative determination devoid of specifics and divorced from the facts of any 
particular case can satisfy the demands of Waller.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
how the holding in Clements can be sustained in light of Globe Newspaper, 
which invalidated the Massachusetts mandatory trial closure law exactly 
because the statute trumped a case-by-case inquiry.329  Finally, where it has 
 
unconstitutional as applied when the trial court cleared the courtroom pursuant to state law in a sex offense 
case without making findings to justify closure). 
 322 Clements, 742 So. 2d at 341.  Clements was yet another sex-crime case.  The defendant was convicted 
of seven counts of sexual battery on a child under twelve and three counts of lewd acts upon a child.  Id. at 
339. 
 323 Id. at 341–42. 
 324 Id. at 341. 
 325 See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1358–59 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the three 
procedural requirements of Waller still must be met in the context of partial closure: the court must hold a 
hearing, make factual findings to support it, and consider reasonable alternatives); see also Douglas v. 
Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 532, 533 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that courtroom closures, whether “total” or 
“partial,” still burden a defendant’s constitutional rights and require that the trial court hold a hearing and 
articulate specific findings before undertaking either). 
 326 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 560, 581 (1980). 
 327 Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
 328 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.8 (1984). 
 329 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 608 n.20 (1982). 
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often been said that the purpose of a public trial is to discourage perjury and to 
encourage witnesses to come forward,330 the press is poorly suited to act as a 
proxy for an interested person who may have specific knowledge of the case or 
whose presence in the courtroom might enhance testimonial trustworthiness. 
D. The Benefit-of-the-Victim Doctrine 
Closing the courtroom pursuant to state law to protect the psychological 
integrity of a child who is a victim-witness in a sex crime prosecution is 
certainly permitted.331  However, courts must not exclude the public without 
first conducting a Waller inquiry.  The tendency to sidestep Waller can also 
surface when the courtroom closure that is ordered goes beyond the parameters 
of the statute and wrongly excludes the press or family members of the 
defendant.  Although the statutory error may be obvious, some appellate courts 
have still upheld the closures, reasoning that because the state statute was 
enacted for the benefit of the victim, the statutory error was “harmless,” or 
simply did not impact the defendant’s rights.332 
In Turner v. State, the defendant was convicted of molesting his 
granddaughter, a child, and appealed.333  Turner cited numerous errors, 
including ineffectiveness of counsel, for failure to object to the trial court’s 
clearing of the courtroom of his immediate family during the victim’s 
testimony.334  Turner alleged a violation of the state statute, not the U.S. 
Constitution, but the response of the Georgia Court of Appeals illustrates the 
flawed rationale that is sometimes employed when courtrooms are closed 
pursuant to victim-witness protection statutes.  Here the courtroom was closed 
under section 17-8-54 of the Georgia Code, which mandates exclusion of a 
range of persons but not the “immediate families” of the parties.335 
As the Supreme Court announced in In re Oliver, the public trial right is 
especially impacted when family members of the accused are excluded from a 
criminal proceeding.336  According to Turner, the trial court committed 
statutory error when it excluded his family members.337  The court of appeals 
 
 330 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. 
 331 Globe Newspaper, 57 U.S. at 608. 
 332 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 333 536 S.E.2d 814, 816 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
 334 Id. at 816, 818. 
 335 See GA. CODE ANN. §17-8-54 (2009). 
 336 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72 (1948); see also supra note 24. 
 337 Turner, 536 S.E.2d at 818. 
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countered by announcing that because the purpose of the trial closure statute 
“is to protect the interest of the child witness, not the defendant,” any failure to 
follow the law did not violate Turner’s rights.338  However, as held by Globe 
Newspaper, Press-Enterprise, and Waller, protecting the interest of the victim-
witness must be balanced against other interests, including the First 
Amendment interests of the press and the public and the Sixth Amendment 
interests of the defendant.339  Georgia’s trial closure statute is partially 
insulated from constitutional infirmity because, while it mandates closure in a 
criminal sex offense case involving testimony of a minor victim, it does not 
require exclusion of “parties to the cause and their immediate families  
or . . . newspaper reporters or broadcasters, and court reporters.”340  However, 
as construed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in cases such as Turner and 
Craven (where family members of the defendant were excluded from the 
courtroom in violation of section 17-8-54 and without a Waller inquiry to 
weigh the defendant’s interest), the trial closure statute is susceptible to 
constitutional challenge.  This is not only because the statute mandates closure 
and thereby prevents a balancing of interests, but especially because Georgia 
courts, unlike those in other states with similar laws, have failed to interpret the 
measure to require a Waller inquiry.341  Thus, by invoking the benefit-of-the-
victim doctrine in the face of statutory errors like those committed in Turner 
and Craven, the Georgia Court of Appeals has made section 17-8-54 of the 
Georgia Code even more vulnerable to constitutional attack. 
This vulnerability is heightened by the court of appeals’s holding that the 
Georgia law can act as a proxy for the individualized findings and case-by-case 
inquiry required by Waller.342  Therefore, as currently construed under Georgia 
law, no Waller inquiry is required when a courtroom is closed pursuant to 
section 17-8-54.  Yet, even if the statute is violated and a total exclusion is 
ordered, the error would ostensibly be excused under the benefit-of-the-victim 
doctrine, regardless of the obvious requirement under Waller to weigh the 
interests of the public and the defendant.  Whether this legal reasoning is as 
untenable as it is incorrect will be for a higher court to decide. 
 
 338 Id. 
 339 See supra Part I.C.3–4; notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
 340 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-54 (2009). 
 341 See supra notes 315–17 and accompanying text. 
 342 Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied (Oct. 27, 2008). 
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E. Presley v. State: An Overarching Failure to Follow Waller 
While many of the cases discussed in this Comment illustrate more than 
one aspect of the failure by courts to properly follow Waller, Presley v. State, 
which was decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in March 2009 but 
overturned 7–2 in a per curiam opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court in January 
2010, perhaps best demonstrates the tendency of some courts to abrogate the 
procedural requirements of Waller altogether.343  In Presley, a routine drug 
trafficking case, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a total courtroom closure 
during voir dire, including the exclusion of a relative of the defendant.344  In 
that case, the trial judge closed the courtroom on her own initiative and over 
the objection of the defendant, ordering the defendant’s uncle to wait outside 
during jury selection, explaining that he could not “sit and intermingle with 
members of the jury panel.”345  Thus, in addition to implicating the public’s 
First Amendment interest in attending voir dire proceedings, the closure also 
disregarded the concern that has been expressed by courts regarding the 
exclusion of family members of a defendant.346 
When Presley’s lawyer objected, the judge announced that the courtroom 
was too small to accommodate both the prospective jurors and the public.347  
This reason is unconvincing, though, as the record included photographs 
showing that space considerations did not justify the closure.348  Beyond 
 
 343 Presley v. State, 674 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 2009), rev’d per curiam, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010); 
see also Alyson M. Palmer, Justices Make Fast Work of Ga. Cases, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Jan. 20, 
2010, at 1. 
 344 Presley, 674 S.E.2d 909.  Presiding Justice Carol W. Hunstein joined Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears in 
dissent.  Id. at 912; see also Alyson M. Palmer, High Court OKs Closed Courtroom: DeKalb Judge Said There 
Wasn’t Enough Space in Courtroom for Both Spectators and Potential Jurors, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, 
Ga.), Mar. 24, 2009, at 1; Daniel Levitas, Op-Ed., Been There, Done That: Georgia Supreme Court Errs in 
Upholding Courtroom Closure that Violates the Right to Public Trial, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Apr. 
8, 2009, at 4. 
 345 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 910.  When the trial judge initially singled out the defendant’s uncle for 
exclusion, she did not recognize that he was a relative.  However, after she identified him as a family member 
of the defendant, the judge still ordered his exclusion.  Defense counsel responded by objecting and asking 
whether “some accommodation could not be made for both, some of those members of the family and the 
jurors.”  The judge denied the request.  Id.; see also Palmer, supra note 344. 
 346 See discussion supra note 24 (noting the particular interest of defendants in having their friends and 
family members present in the courtroom). 
 347 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 910; Palmer, supra note 344. 
 348 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 912 (Sears, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is clear from the pictures in the record that 
complete closure . . . was not required by space considerations, nor was the closure prompted by specific 
conduct by any of the spectators in the courtroom.”); see also Presley v. Georgia, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051, 4051 
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (“At a hearing on the motion [for a new trial], Presley presented evidence showing that 14 
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simply closing the courtroom she also ordered family members of defendants 
to leave the sixth floor of the courthouse entirely.  “That applies to everybody 
who’s got a case,” the judge declared, announcing her presumption that anyone 
affiliated with a defendant might taint the jury pool by interacting with 
prospective jurors in the hallway as well as inside the courtroom.349  
Subsequent proceedings revealed that this may have been standard operating 
procedure for the trial judge who, during the motion for a new trial, declared 
that “other judges ‘may have different policies, but I don’t permit family 
members or witnesses for the State or either side to intermingle or sit on the 
rows with the jurors.’”350 
Although the trial judge held no hearing and made no findings of fact 
necessary to establish the overriding interest she supposedly sought to protect 
by closing the courtroom, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the closure 
under an abuse of discretion standard.351  This illustrates the tendency of 
appellate courts to ignore the cardinal rule laid down by the Supreme Court—
that harmless error analysis should never be applied to violations of Waller.  
Nevertheless, the Georgia Supreme Court erroneously affirmed, 5–2, holding 
that “the trial court certainly had an overriding interest in ensuring that 
potential jurors heard no inherently prejudicial remarks from observers during 
voir dire.”352  The U.S. Supreme Court forcefully disagreed, finding that the 
affirmance by the Georgia justices “contravened . . . clear precedents.”353 
Applying the trial judge’s logic—and the rationale of the Georgia Supreme 
Court—a trial judge could order that voir dire always be conducted privately 
with jurors isolated in a closed courtroom in order to guard against the remote 
possibility that a stray remark might taint the panel.354  The U.S. Supreme 
Court found this logic wholly unsupportable: 
 
prospective jurors could have fit in the jury box and the remaining 28 could have fit entirely on one side of the 
courtroom, leaving adequate room for the public.”). 
 349 Id. 
 350 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Presley v. State, 674 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 2009) (No. S08G1152) 
(quoting Transcript of Motion for New Trial at 60, State v. Presley, No. 04-CR-2574-8 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 4, 
2007)). 
 351 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4051 (citing Presley v. State, 658 S.E.2d 773, 775 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 352 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 911. 
 353 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4051. 
 354 Judges may have legitimate reason to question a juror in private when, for example, the nature of the 
case or comments by the juror indicate a highly sensitive personal matter, or the judge fears the bias of a 
particular panel member might taint the rest of the jury pool if questioning of that juror continues in open 
court.  See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984) (observing that the jury selection 
process may “give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply 
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The generic risk of jurors overhearing prejudicial remarks, 
unsubstantiated by any specific threat or incident, is inherent 
whenever members of the public are present during the selection of 
jurors.  If broad concerns of this sort were sufficient to override a 
defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial, a court could exclude 
the public from jury selection almost as a matter of course.355 
Furthermore, ordering a preemptive courtroom closure is hardly the least 
restrictive means for dealing with the speculative risk of a tainted jury pool—
even if the goal is to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  If a trial court is 
concerned that comments in the gallery will contaminate the jury panel, the 
least restrictive response is to issue a clear admonition about proper conduct 
during voir dire and to arrange the seating to minimize communicative 
conduct.356  If those measures are not sufficient, a judge can always declare a 
mistrial in the unlikely event that contaminating comments are made.  
However, closing the courtroom preemptively, as occurred in Presley, 
represents just the kind of generalized and unsupportable judicial conduct that 
the Supreme Court has consistently forbidden, beginning with Richmond 
Newspapers and extending through Waller.357 
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented on the ground that Presley should not 
have been disposed of summarily because the leading case addressing the 
public trial right in the context of jury selection, Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court of California, dealt with the public’s First Amendment right to 
attend jury selection, and so it remains an open question whether a defendant’s 
 
personal matters” and that jurors may request an opportunity to present the problem to the judge in private, but 
with counsel present and on the record).  However, conducting private, personalized voir dire as a routine 
matter would almost certainly run afoul of the principles condemned by the Supreme Court in Waller.  Routine 
private questioning of jurors without good cause appears similar to Michigan’s “one-man grand jury” system 
struck down by the Supreme Court in In re Oliver.  See discussion supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
 355 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4053.  To support their analysis, the majority cited dissenting Georgia 
Supreme Court Justices Carol W. Hunstein and Leah Ward Sears, who explained: “[T]he majority’s reasoning 
permits the closure of voir dire in every criminal case . . . whenever the trial judge decides, for whatever 
reason, that he or she would prefer to fill the courtroom with potential jurors rather than spectators.”  Id. 
(quoting Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 913 (Sears, C.J., dissenting)). 
 356 Id. (“Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at 
criminal trials. . . .  [S]ome possibilities include reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury 
venire panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or interact with 
audience members.”). 
 357 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  Justices Sears and Hunstein expressed this same view in 
their Presley dissent: “The majority today gives the trial courts in these cases the green light to exclude the 
public entirely from voir dire in all of them, contrary to the express commands of the Sixth Amendment, the 
Georgia Constitution, Waller, and Lumpkin.”  Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 913–14 (Sears, C.J., dissenting) 
(referencing R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 292 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. 1982)). 
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Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire.  In short, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas disagreed with the majority’s conclusion “by  
implication . . . that jury voir dire is part of the ‘public trial’ that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees.”358  However, in light of the extensive Supreme Court 
jurisprudence articulating the sanctity of the public trial guarantee under both 
the First and Sixth Amendments, this is not an issue that seemed to trouble the 
seven-member majority.  As stated in the per curiam opinion, while “[t]he 
extent to which the First and Sixth Amendment public trial rights are 
coextensive is an open question,” whether the Sixth Amendment right extends 
to jury voir dire is “so well settled . . . that this Court may proceed by summary 
disposition.”359  As the majority explained, “The public has a right to be 
present [during voir dire] whether or not any party has asserted the right.”360 
The Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Presley was deeply flawed, but 
perhaps nowhere more so than its holding that the burden to propose 
alternatives to closure rests on the party opposing closure, not on the trial 
court.361  A majority of Georgia justices claimed that Waller did not “provide 
clear guidance” on this question,362 but seven U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
sharply disagreed: 
[T]he Supreme Court of Georgia concluded, despite our explicit 
statements to the contrary, that trial courts need not consider 
alternatives to closure absent an opposing party’s proffer of some 
alternatives.  While the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded this 
was an open question under this Court’s precedents, the statement in 
Waller that “the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to 
closing the proceeding,” settles the point.363 
The Presley dissenters disagreed, citing Ayala v. Speckard, a Second 
Circuit case holding that the burden of proposing alternatives falls on the party 
opposing closure.364  But even in announcing their dissent, Justice Scalia and 
 
 358 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4053 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 359 Id. at 4052 (per curiam). 
 360 Id. 
 361 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 911–12.  In Presley, the trial judge acted abruptly, sua sponte, when she 
banished the public from the courtroom.  Id. at 912 (Sears, C.J., dissenting). 
 362 Id. at 911 (majority opinion). 
 363 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4052 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)). 
 364 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4054 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 70–72 
(2d Cir. 1997) (en banc)).  In Ayala, the court concluded: 
Whether or not a sua sponte obligation exists to consider alternatives to complete closure, we see 
nothing in the First Amendment cases or in Waller to indicate that once a trial judge has 
determined that limited closure is warranted as an alternative to complete closure, the judge must 
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Justice Thomas conceded that “the language [of both Waller and Press-
Enterprise] can easily be read to imply” that “the trial court must suggest such 
alternatives in the absence of a proffer.”365 
Presley was a routine drug trafficking case, unlike Craven, Anderson, 
Priola, and Clements, which each involved child victims of criminal sexual 
misconduct.  If these latter cases illustrate how appellate courts are willing to 
employ harmless error analysis, use post hoc findings, ignore the rule of plain 
error, or invoke the statutory cover of the benefit-of-the-victim doctrine to 
justify upholding the conviction of an “obviously guilty” defendant accused of 
perpetrating a heinous crime upon a child, then Presley stands for the 
inclination of some jurists—hopefully rare—to summarily disregard the 
blackletter law of Waller altogether.  After all, the trial judge freely admitted 
her penchant for excluding family members of defendants and others during 
voir dire.366  Although the evidentiary obstacles may be too difficult to 
surmount, it remains to be seen whether the convictions of other defendants 
who have stood trial in this judge’s courtroom are likely to be reversed in light 
of Presley. 
CONCLUSION 
In the twenty-five years since Waller v. Georgia was decided, the Supreme 
Court has never cast doubt on the four-part test it set forth to ensure the 
constitutionality of courtroom closures.  Nor has the Court questioned its 
longstanding rule that harmless error never applies to violations of the public 
trial right.  In fact, even as the list of constitutional errors subject to harmless 
 
sua sponte consider further alternatives to the alternative deemed appropriate.  At that point, it 
becomes the obligation of the party objecting to the trial court’s proposal to urge consideration of 
any further alternatives that might avoid the need for even a limited closure. 
Ayala, 131 F.3d at 71.  The New York Court of Appeals announced an identical holding in People v. Ramos, 
685 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1997), a companion case to Ayala in which the propriety of courtroom closure during 
undercover police officer testimony was challenged unsuccessfully by the defendants.  In Ramos, the court 
held:  
[T]he question as to who is responsible for enumerating desirable alternatives to closure was not 
before the Waller Court.  Squarely faced with that question now, we conclude that, where the 
factual record permits closure and the closure is not facially overbroad, the party opposed to 
closing the proceeding must alert the court to any alternative procedures that allegedly would 
equally preserve the interest.   
Ramos, 685 N.E.2d at 500 (citation omitted). 
 365 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4054 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 366 See supra note 350 and accompanying text. 
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error analysis grew, the Court reiterated that violations of the public trial right 
could never be classified as harmless.  A similar pattern is evident in the 
application of plain error review.  Even as the Court moved certain violations 
of fundamental rights out from under the umbrella of protection afforded by 
plain error review, the test the Court established for applying plain error 
became considerably more sympathetic to the public trial right because it 
emphasized the fairness and integrity of a criminal proceeding. 
In light of the clarity of the four-part test laid down in Waller, the 
consistency with which the Supreme Court has referred to violations of Waller 
as structural error, and the straightforward applicability of the plain error rule, 
violations of the public trial right should be exceedingly difficult to defend.  
Curiously, this does not appear to be the case in the lower courts.  Appellate 
courts persist in sterilizing violations of the public trial right by holding such 
errors “harmless;” manufacturing consent to avoid application of the plain 
error rule; permitting post hoc findings to rationalize improper closures; 
claiming that a state statutory scheme is a valid substitute for a careful, case-
by-case inquiry; and asserting that only a substantial—not an overriding—
interest is needed to justify a “partial closure,” or that partial closure negates 
the need to comply with Waller altogether.  While these shortcomings are the 
exception, not the rule,  violations of the public trial right, like those described 
in this Comment, still occur far too often.  These decisions thus “erode[] the 
individual rights and liberties that are presumed to elevate our system of 
justice[,] . . . . dilute[] the force of our laws and shrink[] the boundaries of the 
sphere of individual autonomy.”367  They also send powerful signals that trial 
courts below can continue to engage in improper courtroom closures.  
However, as the Supreme Court has recently announced in Presley,  
 
 
 367 Edwards, supra note 5, at 1194–95 (punctuation omitted).  See also Ayala, 131 F.3d at 82 (Parker, J., 
dissenting) (“It is galling to my sense of fairness that courtroom closure is such a routine practice in New York 
buy-and-bust cases.”); John M. Leventhal, Public Trial: Keeping the Undercover “Undercover”, N.Y. L.J., 
Nov. 3, 1992, at col. 1 (“Although the courts [of New York] formally reject a per se exception for an 
undercover witness, a showing of almost any factor will justify closure.”).
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there is no question that trial courts must rigorously follow the requirements 
laid down in Waller, and when they fail to do so, appellate courts must have 




 ∗ Executive Managing Editor, Emory Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, Emory University School of Law 
(2010).  I am especially grateful to Professor Kay Levine, my faculty advisor, for her guidance and insightful 
feedback on numerous drafts.  I would also like to thank my indefatigable colleagues on the Emory Law 
Journal Executive Board, Amanda Burns, Erin East, and Deepthy Kishore, as well as Managing Editor 
William W. Gill. 
